


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THE
Globe



Marine Corps Gazette

NOVEMBER 1953

NUMBER 11

VOLUME 37

PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

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COVER

Piracy at Tripoli . . . Montezuma Castle . . . Belleau Wood . . . Nicaragua . . . Tarawa and Iwo . . . Korea. This month's cover could well be a scene from the Marine's Valhalla. Staff artist Tony Kokinos (shown putting the finishing touches on the oil painting) reminds us that this month marks the 178th Anniversary of our Corps. Birthday cakes, dress blues and swords become the order of the day November 10th as we celebrate throughout the world. And just in case anyone misses noon chow formation on that red-letter day, the Commandant's annual message is reprinted on the back cover.

PUBLISHED BY THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION

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Opinions expressed in the Gazette do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps



This photograph, taken recently, shows Angus Macdonald looking at the famous old painting, "The Spirit of Service," for which he posed after the great blizzard of 1888. Mr. Macdonald, now 88, has been retired on pension for many years.

Angus Macdonald Broke a Trail

Many telephone men and women have known the test of storm and fire and flood. One of the first was a young lineman named Angus Macdonald.

The year was 1888. The telephone was only twelve years old then, and Long Distance lines had just been placed in service between New York and Boston. Angus Macdonald was working on these lines when the great blizzard of '88 struck.

For three days and nights it snowed, piling drifts as high as houses, blocking roads, stalling trains. The wind and cold kept most folks inside their homes.

But Angus and other telephone men were out on snowshoes throughout the storm. Day and night they patrolled the lines, climbing poles and mending wires to keep the service going.

Out of their deeds was born a painting and a name for the skill,

courage and resourcefulness of telephone men and women. Angus Macdonald was asked to pose for this painting, "The Spirit of Service."

Today you will see this picture in many telephone buildings throughout the country.

Today, too, you will still see the determination of telephone people, no matter what problems may arise, to get the message through.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM





CONGO 'COPTER—Health authorities of the Belgian Congo have won a battle against dread disease-carrying insects. Sikorsky S-51 helicopters spray insecticides on

vast breeding areas inaccessible to other aircraft or spray equipment. Leopoldville residents are reported now to be as safe from carrier insects as are New Yorkers.

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



"DRY RUN" RESCUE—Here a Navy HO3S Sikorsky helicopter awaits the loading of a "wounded" man carried on a stretcher improvised of poles and Navy jackets. This pickup was part of a practice operation for search and rescue helicopters and survival parties. The HO3S Sikorsky is specially equipped to carry litter patients.



UNUSUAL CARGO—This crashed Army L-19 liaison plane was salvaged with ease in Korea by an Army Sikorsky H-19 helicopter. Two trips were needed to fly the damaged wings, engine and fuselage (above, in cargo sling) to a repair depot. Army Sikorsky helicopters are now solving hundreds of tough, unusual transportation problems.

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SPECIAL AIRLIFT—A wounded veteran, after months in a North Korean PW camp, is carried from an Army Sikorsky H-19 helicopter to a South Korean hospital in Seoul. As in earlier prisoner exchange activities, Army Sikorsky helicopters played a big part in the post-truce prisoner exchange, providing airlift for repatriated soldiers and other personnel.



SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

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message center

They Read Us 5 x 5 in Norway

Dear Sir:

I hope you will excuse a Norwegian adding a word or two to your discussions on the pack, for I would like to comment on Captain Ludwig's article in the March GAZETTE. Being an officer and a skier, I am quite accustomed to carrying a pack and I can understand why most of you Marines don't like the old-fashioned back-breaking field transport pack.


In the Norwegian army we usually estimate the basic burden of a soldier to be 30 pounds. This estimate includes only the personal weapon, ammo, hand grenades and a spade—what we call the primary pack.

When talking about packs we

the hips carry most of the burden—a design which places most of the load near the back and high up is recommended.

Since World War II a new type of rucksack has appeared on our civilian market that breaks with the conventional shape. The frame is very broad on the shoulder part and the sack is turned upside-down, as it were, with the bulkiest part of the pack being the top part—a cornet shape I believe you call it.

I have used this type myself for military and civilian purposes and have found it to be the best type of pack I have ever used. The broad shoulder frame is very comfortable, the load rests close to the back and the weight is carried mostly on the hips. The pressure on the hips is



usually think of three types: the primary pack, the combat pack and the marching pack. The primary pack is a necessity for the soldier—he can't fight without it. The combat and the marching pack should be a combination of both with a simple patent of sorts designed so that the combat pack can be released.

Even with a very light combat pack the combined weight of the combat and primary loads will give the soldier a burden of about 40 pounds to carry. This weight must be carried on the shoulders and the hips, and the more you can carry on the hips the better. The rucksack, therefore, must be designed so that

softened by a broad strap between the horns of the hip frame. Even on skis, where balance is an essential, a pack of this type is preferable.

I am enclosing two pictures of the civilian type cornet-shaped rucksack. It might be of interest to you Marines to have a look at what I consider to be the ideal rucksack.

SVERRE ERLANDSEN
1stLt, Norwegian
Home Guards

Bergen, Norway

Foul Ball?

Dear Sir:

The book review of *The Southpaw* was very well written and entertaining but how did such find its way

into the GAZETTE? Is the subject matter remotely connected with the military?

W. F. PRICKETT
Colonel, USMC

Arlington, Va.

ED: *There's a statement attributed to the Duke of Wellington which should answer your question—"The Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton."*

Flying Windmills in Korea

Dear Sir:

With regard to *Flying Windmills in Korea*, it should be noted that of the wire lines laid to the Reconnaissance Co on 884 from the 1st Marines OP, only two of eight could be used. These two lines, however, were utilized a few days later by 1/1 when it relieved Recon Co, and to my knowledge these . . . lines were still in two months later, never having been broken. A remarkable feat for a battalion-regiment wire line.

Later in October 1951, elements of 1/1 were transported by HMR-161 in an unusual operation. Infiltrators were believed to be in an area between the MSR and a parallel (north-south) ridgeline behind the front lines. Early one morning 18 rifle squads were dropped on this ridgeline (extending from the front lines south past 1st Mar Div CP), and proceeded down the various spurs (west), bushwacking for infiltrators.

Each squad had an SCR-300 on a net with its parent company; each company in turn on a battalion net. There was a north and a south relay


Each month the GAZETTE pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the GAZETTE requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.

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pressure?..*

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Marine Corps Gazette • November, 1953



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haps hastened by the power of suggestion . . . were ready to affirm the incident as reported. The majority of people to whom I spoke agreed with me that this must have been a UN C-47 on a routine psychological warfare mission, flying a bit close to our own lines. A check with the PsychWar Branch should end the controversy once and for all.

Incidentally, these articles by Mr. Montross are excellent and, presenting the big picture as they do, provide some of us whose activity was limited to battalion level with a comprehensive view of what we helped do.

WILLIAM F. ALSOP, JR.
Captain, USMC

Boston, Mass.

Principles of War . . .

Dear Sir:

As a belated follow-up to LtCol F. S. Aldridge's article on the Principles of War, this comment on any tendency to attribute infallibility to the principles of war is noteworthy:

"The broad laws of strategy are roughly the broad laws of life, you might say. When you begin to talk

about co-operation and surprise, concentration and maneuver, really you are talking about the way you handle the affairs of your life. You merely are following certain common-sense rules that somebody who called himself a scholar codified and called 'Principles of War.' They sometimes make me chuckle—because you break at least one of those principles every-time you fight a battle."

The commentator was General Eisenhower.

PAUL F. REESE
LtCol, USMC

Quantico, Va.

Of Time . . . and Rockets

Dear Sir:

. . . I'm of the opinion that the Corps has missed a bet by not adapting the 3.5 rocket as an effective anti-personnel weapon. This could be done by incorporating a time fuse on the rocket ammo. I would suggest using an electro-magnetic time fuse, so designed that it could be set to create air bursts.

JAMES C. DOWDY
Pfc, USMC

Korea

Same Opportunities . . .

Dear Sir:

Your article *From Rotsy to Marine* in the September GAZETTE was interesting and enlightening, but it brings to mind a little problem. Why not give Naval Academy graduates who enter the Marine Corps the same opportunities that NROTC graduates have? . . . I'm sure that, given the chance, these men would more than appreciate the opportunity to spend six weeks at Quantico during the summer. . . .

EDWARD R. PERRON
Midshipman, USN

Annapolis, Md.

Ed: *It is the policy of HQMC to order second lieutenants commissioned from the Naval Academy to the Basic School, Quantico, Va., for training before assignment to the field.*

Wants WM Information

Dear Sir:

I read your *Message Center* in the GAZETTE and I think it is a very nice part of the magazine. . . . I would like to have some information on Women Marines, as I want to be one when I finish school. . . .

SHEILA J. PLUMLEY
Charleston, W. Va.

Ed: *Keep watching. One of our regular contributors is preparing an article on women in service for publication soon.*

Maggie's Drawers For Us

Dear Sir:

There's no doubt that the Camp Lejeune Skeet Team broke a record at the Great Cotton States Open Shoot, but the GAZETTE "missed the pigeon" on the correct location.

As Marine recruiters in South Carolina we don't dare show the "Spartans" of Spartanburg, South Carolina the *In Brief* column of your very fine magazine.

JACK L. TYLER
TSgt, USMC
JACK MANGUM
SSgt, USMC
TOM SILK
SSgt, USMC

Columbia, S. C.

Ed: *North is north and South is south and never the twain shall meet. Our apologies to Kipling and the 36,795 people of S-P-A-R-T-A-N-B-U-R-G, S-O-U-T-H Carolina.*

Marine Corps Gazette • November, 1953

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Our authors

☛ **Captain Harold R. Stevens, USN**, is the author of *Samuel Nicholas: Innkeeper-Marine*, this month's lead article. Captain Stevens became interested in the first Marine Commandant through his present duties as Professor of Naval Science at Nicholas' alma mater, the University of Pennsylvania. A 1922 graduate of the Naval Academy, Captain Stevens' pre-World War II duty was aboard ship in the Atlantic and Pacific bases on the East and West coasts.



CAPT STEVENS

During the war, he spent four years at sea and was awarded the Bronze Star with "V" for his part in the Normandy invasion. He also wears the Navy Unit Citation for action in the South Pacific theater.

☛ **MSgt Charles V. Crumb** returns this month with *Company Officer Shortage*, page 28. Prior to enlisting in 1936, Sergeant Crumb taught school in the Freeborn (Minnesota) county schools.



MSGT CRUMB

On continuous active duty since that date, he has to his credit a stint of duty with the old 4th Marines in Shanghai, recruiting, and as an assistant instructor with the NROTC unit at Iowa State College. During World War II, he joined the commissioned ranks and saw two campaigns with the 2d Mar Div. He is currently with the FMFPAC Troops NCO School at Camp Pendleton.

☛ **Lynn Montross** returns this month with *The Man with the Rifle* (page 16), the first of a three-part article that will trace the infantryman's history and development from 331 B.C. through Korea.

☛ The final stage of a pilot's training for combat, as practiced by a Marine squadron in Korea, is the subject of **Major Thomas J. Saxon's** *Cook's Tour for Pilots*, page 37. Commissioned in 1943, the major has had continuous service with the exception of six months in 1946. He has served with VMF-222, VMF-322, the 2d MAW, and in Korea with VMA-323 and as PIO with the 1st MAW. Major Saxon is presently CO of VMA-333, Miami, Florida.



MAJ SAXON

☛ **Captain Joseph H. Strain** participated in HMR-161's salvage operation described in *Sky Hook* on page 56. Captain Strain enlisted in 1943, and served until 1946, when he returned to Suffolk University in Boston as Assistant Professor of English. In his spare time, he earned an A.M. degree in English. Again in Marine uniform from 1950-53, he has since returned to Suffolk as Head of the Speech Department.



CAPT STRAIN

☛ *Get With Them* (page 24), the plea to battalion commanders to forego the CP for frontline observation, is the work of **Major Gerald P. Averill**. Beginning his career as a rifleman in 1941, the major was commissioned in 1942. Soon thereafter, he joined the FMF for a tour that lasted almost ten years.



MAJ AVERILL

He earned battle stars for campaigns at New Georgia, Bougainville, the Northern Solomons, Iwo Jima and Korea. His individual combat awards include the Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Letter of Commendation and Purple Heart. Major Averill is now with the Tactics Section, Junior School, Quantico.

☛ The new concept of *Outpost Warfare* is discussed by **1stLt Peter Braestrup** on page 32. His first contribution to the GAZETTE, this is not Lieutenant Braestrup's first venture into the journalism field: in 1949 he was editor and publisher of the weekly *Connecticut Shore* (circ. 1200), and while earning his BA in English from Yale, he was class historian and feature editor for the *Yale Daily News*. Commissioned in 1951, Lieutenant Braestrup served in Korea from June 1952, until wounded on November 8, 1952. Released to inactive duty early this year, he is now a contributing editor to *Time* magazine.



1stLT BRAESTRUP

☛ The little-known exploits of the *Rebel Marines* during the Civil War are brought to light by **Major Patrick Laughlin** on page 52. Commissioned in 1940, the major spent the war years in the Caribbean and Pacific areas. Released in 1946, he spent the next six years in Hollywood as an agent and scriptwriter, and also earned his M.A. from the University of New Mexico. Recalled to active duty in 1952, he is serving now as PIO for the Weldfast Force (NATO) in Europe.

☛ **LtCol Franklin B. Nihart**, *Two Make a Team* (page 40), has had three tours of duty with the 1st Mar Div since entering the Marine Corps in 1938. He served with the division in 1941, again in 1945-46 in China, and during 1951-52 as a battalion commander in Korea. Sandwiched in between these tours were sea-duty, the Command and Staff School at Quantico and two tours of duty at TTU Pacific. He came to his present assignment with the Personal Affairs Branch at HQMC from the 3d Mar Div at Camp Pendleton, California.



LTCOL NIHART



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
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Marine

*Sportsman, businessman and adventurer—this was
the background of the man who
became the first Commandant of the Marine Corps*

By Capt Harold R. Stevens, USN

IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY PHILADELPHIA there was a popular inn, "Conestoga Wagon" by name, located at the corner of Fourth and Market Streets and operated by one Anthony Nicholas and his wife, Mary Shute Nicholas. Both members of this couple had family connections with the leading figures of colonial Philadelphia. Anthony was a son of an eminent Philadelphia lawyer, and Mary was a sister of Atwood Shute, who was mayor of Philadelphia in 1757-58. Their inn was a popular rendezvous for the German farmers of the surrounding countryside when they visited the city. It was also a gathering place for the gentlemen who followed the popular sport of horse racing. Indeed, there was a time when all horses entered in a Philadelphia race meeting were kept in the stables operated in conjunction with the Nicholas' inn.

This was the background to which Samuel Nicholas was born in 1744. He had two sisters, but Samuel was the only son of Anthony and Mary Nicholas.

Samuel learned to assume responsibility at an early age. His father died in 1751, when Samuel was seven years old. His mother continued to operate the inn, and it is easy to picture him helping her about the place during his boyhood and young manhood, assuming more and more of the responsibility as time went on. Eventually he probably relieved his mother entirely of the duties of management.

By modern standards, Samuel seems to have had little formal education, but his education was considerably better than average for the time and place in which he lived. Thanks to the financial backing of his uncle, Atwood Shute, he was able to enter the Academy of Philadel-

phia on January 8, 1752, just one year after that institution held its first classes. He was in continuous attendance at the academy until December 17, 1759. These eight years were all of Samuel's school years. The newly founded academy which Samuel Nicholas attended was the forerunner of what is now the University of Pennsylvania.

Probably because he was anxious to measure up to the responsibilities thrust upon him by the early loss of his father, Samuel Nicholas seems to have matured at an early age. Shortly after he left the Academy he was elected to membership in "The Schuylkill Fishing Company of the Colony in Schuylkill," an organization which was and, for that matter, still is dedicated to the twin objectives of providing conviviality and exercise. This unique organization strictly limited the number of its members, and competition to fill the vacancies which occurred was quite keen. This election of a youth of 16, taken in conjunction with the fact that the Nicholas inn was then at the height of its popularity with the horse-racing fraternity, gives ample proof that young Nicholas had already won a place for himself with the sports-loving elements of Philadelphia society.

Another famous sporting group in colonial Philadelphia was the Gloucester Fox Hunting Club. Samuel Nicholas was one of a group of 27 prominent citizens who founded this organization in 1766.

From this rather sketchy account of his early years evolves a fairly clear portrait of the man Samuel Nicholas must have been in 1775, when his military career began. A popular young bachelor, aged 31, probably as well-educated as his non-professional contemporaries, socially



1775

associated with the leading men of the community, physically hardened by constant participation in the outdoor sports of the day, the effervescent spirit absorbed from the sporting world somewhat chastened by early responsibilities and association with the sturdy German farmers who frequented his inn, he would be an ideal officer candidate for the Marine Corps today, just as he was then.

In the fall of 1775, when the Continental Congress decided to outfit a fleet for operations against the British, Nicholas was selected to be the senior Marine officer in that fleet. Anticipating his appointment, early in November he began recruiting Marines for service in the fleet. On November 28, 1775, he was commissioned Captain of Marines and was assigned duty in the *Alfred*, flagship of Commodore Esek Hopkins, Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. It is noteworthy that his service in that ship associated him with the man who was to become the outstanding American naval hero of the Revolution, for John Paul Jones was first lieutenant of the *Alfred*.

The first operation of the newly organized fleet is usually hailed as an outstanding success. It was successful, but it was not the operation

for which the fleet was intended, and, had it been more forcefully executed, the success could have been more complete.


It was the desire of the Congress that the fleet first destroy the small British naval forces then operating in Chesapeake Bay, then those operating off the coast of the Carolinas and finally those in Rhode Island. But Hopkins preferred to undertake a raid on the island of New Providence in the Bahamas where the British were known to have a store of powder, that commodity being in short supply for American forces.

After numerous delays the fleet sailed from the Delaware Capes on February 17, 1776 and proceeded to Abaco Island in the Bahamas, arriving there March 1st. The force consisted of two ships, two brigs, two sloops and two schooners. While approaching Abaco, two sloops from New Providence were captured. It was decided that surprise could be gained if these captured vessels were used to transport the landing force, the fleet remaining out of sight until the troops were ashore and then closing to support their advance on the town of Nassau, seat of government and center of activity on the island.

Nassau was situated on the north coast of the island, its harbor protected by the smaller Hog Island offshore, with entrances around both ends of that island. Each entrance was guarded by a fort on New Providence, Fort Montague at the eastern entrance and Fort Nassau at the western.

The landing force of 200 Marines and 50 sailors, commanded by Captain Nicholas, embarked in the captured craft the evening of March 2d and next morning the fleet got underway for the attack. Hopkins forfeited the element of surprise by getting within sight of New Providence even before he detached the two troop carriers. Nevertheless, the landing was made at the eastern end of the island without opposition. Nicholas promptly advanced along the north shore toward Fort Montague. As his troops approached the fort, the garrison ineffectively fired three 12-pound shot and then abandoned the fort.

Probably because he could not know that the British governor had



Bettmann

Washington at the Delaware—a rare occasion for Marines

no intention of putting up any resistance, Nicholas now made what, in retrospect, appears to have been an error of judgment. Instead of pressing on at once to occupy the town, he occupied Fort Montague and spent the night there. Next morning he did occupy the town and Fort Nassau without opposition.

Now a really grievous error by Commodore Hopkins became apparent. Although a considerable number of guns and other supplies were captured, there were only 24 casks of powder, the precious commodity which was the reason for the expedition. One hundred and fifty casks had been shipped away during the night through the eastern exit from the harbor which Hopkins had completely neglected to guard with his ships. The vessel which carried it must have passed within easy range of Nicholas and his Marines in Fort Montague.

On March 17 the fleet sailed for home, taking along the governor and two other officials from the island. The voyage had a fighting ending. As the fleet approached Block Island on April 4, contacts began to be made with vessels from the British force based at Newport. A six-gun schooner was captured that day.

At daylight next morning a brig was captured, and that evening a brigantine and a sloop.

Then, at 0130 the morning of April 6, contact was made with HMS *Glasgow*, whose armament was about equal to that of the *Alfred*. Since the fleet was not well-trained as a unit, Commodore Hopkins was unable to make effective use of his full force, and the brunt of the battle was borne by the *Alfred*. At the very beginning of the action, Captain Nicholas, at his station on the quarterdeck, had the unhappy experience of seeing his second lieutenant, who was standing beside him, killed by a musket ball through his head.

The action lasted three hours. At the end, the steering gear of the *Alfred* was shot away and the *Glasgow* then got in several raking broadsides before she ran for Newport. The *Glasgow* had been severely damaged and might well have been captured had the remaining ships of the fleet made a vigorous pursuit. Such pursuit as was made appears to have been rather cautiously done, and Hopkins shortly signalled to break off the pursuit and re-assembled the fleet.

On April 7th the fleet arrived at New London, and shortly thereafter

Captain Nicholas returned to Philadelphia.

Back in his home town and at the seat of government, Nicholas was employed for the next several months as a Marine recruiting officer. He enlisted three companies of Marines for service in three frigates which fitted out at Philadelphia, and a battalion which was not assigned duty afloat. On June 25, 1776, he was promoted to major, the only officer of that rank in the Marine Corps.

When General Washington planned his famous crossing of the Delaware to attack the British forces concentrated around Trenton, New Jersey, Nicholas and his battalion of Marines were temporarily assigned to General Cadwalader's division of the Army. On Christmas night, 1776, Washington made his successful raid, but it was a rare occasion for the Marines for they did not play a prominent part in this amphibious operation.

Because he was unable to get his artillery ashore on the New Jersey side of the river, General Cadwalader did not land, but returned with his division to the Pennsylvania side. Later the division did cross the river and participated in the second battle of Trenton on January 2, 1777, and the battle of Princeton the following day. In these two engagements Major Nicholas and his Marines were able to compensate themselves for the disappointment they had suffered that Christmas night.

This seemed to have been Samuel Nicholas' last combat experience. About March 1st his battalion was detached from duty with the Army and he returned with it to Philadelphia.

Here, he now took up the duties which resulted in his later being recognized as the first Commandant of the Marine Corps. Besides being responsible for all Marine recruiting and procurement of equipment, he also served as Muster Master of the Navy. These important duties were performed during the remainder of the Revolutionary War period.

Despite the multiplicity of his military duties, Nicholas found time, during this latter part of the war, to resume some of the gay social life he so thoroughly enjoyed. His courtship of Mary Jenkins, daughter of Dr. Charles Jenkins of Jenkintown, Pennsylvania, was successful and

they were married in 1778. In 1779 he served on a committee to reorganize the "Colony in Schuylkill," but the various members of the society were so involved in the war effort that this idea had to be postponed for another two years.

At some time in the year 1781, Samuel Nicholas was discharged from the Marines and returned to his business as an innkeeper. One of his final duties before returning to civil life was to serve as a member of a court martial.

Nicholas spent most of the next nine years in Philadelphia. His wife, Mary, gave him a family of five children, three sons and two daughters.

employed he made at least one voyage to China. That trip kept him away from Philadelphia for a longer period than at any other time during his life.

On August 27, 1790, the life of this active social leader, innkeeper and Marine came to an end at the early age of 46. He was buried in the Friends Burial Grounds at Fourth and Arch Streets in Philadelphia. The wheel of life had turned full circle. Like his father before him, Major Nicholas left the family inn for the support of his widow and children, and they continued to operate it.

Today, the Department of Naval



Trenton, Princeton, then a tour of recruiting

He was active in the affairs of the two social organizations which had provided him with much of his pleasure in earlier days and was also a charter member of the Society of Cincinnati of Pennsylvania, whose standing committee customarily met in his inn.

Raising a family of five children and at the same time supporting an extensively active social life appears to have required more financial support than could be provided by the income from operation of an inn during those post-war years. For a time Nicholas went to sea as supercargo in ships operated by the eccentric but benevolent Philadelphia merchant, Stephen Girard. While so

Science at the University of Pennsylvania is housed in Stephen Decatur Hall, which was named for the famous naval officer who once was a student at the university. One room in this building contains a modest professional library and also serves as a lounge and study room for the NROTC students. Here, for future Marine officers to see, is a plaque to Major Samuel Nicholas, Class of 1752.

Thus, as Marines around the world note the Corps' birthday this month, there will be talk of Tun Tavern, where the first Leathernecks signed for service, and of the man who signed them: Samuel Nicholas, the innkeeper who was a Marine. USMC

THE MAN



ILLUSTRATIONS FROM BETTMANN ARCHIVE

N WITH THE RIFLE

By Lynn Montross

Boring in, wielding weapons with his two hands, it is man himself who comes to grips with the enemy at the finish

Part I

THE OCCASION WAS THE BATTLE of Arbela. The time was an autumn day in the year 331 B.C. and the man with the rifle was there.

He would have to wait about 15 more centuries, it is true, for the invention of gunpowder. And he would have to wait another six centuries for an effective firearm with a spirally grooved bore which imparted a spinning motion to the ball. Yet the man with the rifle was there symbolically on the field of Arbela in 331 B.C. He has always been there, in every age of history, as a trained infantryman armed with some sort of missile weapon and some sort of cutting or thrusting weapon—if not actually the rifle and bayonet, at least their military ancestors of past centuries such as the dart and sword or the bow and spear.

That is why the infantry has so long been known as the “queen of battles.” No other arm has ruled so many decisive fields of history, all the way from Arbela down the ages to Inchon-Seoul.

It may seem a far cry from the bronze-helmeted Greek warriors of Arbela to the steel-helmeted U. S. Marines who stormed ashore at Inchon more than 2,000 years later. Yet the two forces had one great thing in common. Both in 331 B.C. and 1950 A.D., it took the infantry to collect after the supporting arms had sued for victory.

Between these dates, nearly all the decisive battles of world history have been won in the final issue by infantry action. The essential combination of missile and shock effect has taken various forms throughout the ages, of course, but it is man himself, boring in on his two feet, wielding weapons with his two hands, who comes to grips with the enemy at the finish. It is man himself who is the most terrible weapon of war!

The U. S. Marine Corps has been from the beginning an infantry organization. Hovering over the Leathernecks of 1950, as they climbed the seawall at Inchon, were the spirits of other Leathernecks who fought as infantry in past ages of American history.

There were the Marines of 1942 who landed at Guadalcanal to stop the victory-flushed Japanese and give them their first serious reverse on land.

There were the Marines in campaign hats who combed the jungles of Nicaragua for bandits in 1932.

There were the Marines of World War I who gave the Germans some painful lessons in rifle marksmanship in Belleau Wood and the Argonne.

There were the Marines who put



Alexander's phalanx turned the scythe blades

down insurrections in the Dominican Republic in 1912 and in Haiti in 1915.

There were the Marines who fought in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and the Spanish-American War of 1898.

There were the Marines who made the bloody assault on Fort Fisher in the Civil War.

There were the Marines who battled their way into "the halls of Montezuma" in 1848 and the Marines who planted the American flag on the shores of Tripoli in 1805.

There were the Marines of the Revolution who launched an amphibious attack on Nassau and fired

from the tops of the *Bonhomme Richard* when John Paul Jones had his famous fight with the *Serapis*.


Seven generations of Marines and all of them trained basically in infantry tactics! But this is in line with the teachings of history, for most of the conquering armies of past ages have been infantry hosts. Arbela is the first battle of the ancient world offering some comparison to modern tactics, and in that clash of 331 B.C. the Greek infantry won the decisive action of a prolonged duel to the death between East and West.

The Persian monarch started it in 490 B.C. by attacking Greece for the avowed purpose of enslaving its inhabitants. And here it is noteworthy that throughout history the infantry has usually been the arm of freemen fighting for their liberties. On this occasion the Greek infantry defeated the seaborne invaders on the plain of Marathon. A decade later the Persians tried again, only to be

routed with frightful losses in the great sea battle of Salamis by Greek Marines using boarding tactics and fighting as infantry.

During the following century the disputing Greek city-states were violently united by Macedonian conquest. Alexander the Great, as a young man of 21, inherited a Graeco-Macedonian army ranking as one of the foremost military instruments of history. It was an army with a cavalry arm, an engineering corps, a medical corps and an effective "artillery" consisting of powerful war engines discharging spears and stones. But it was primarily an infantry army which set out from Greece to conquer the world.

Two Persian forces went down to defeat while attempting to stop Alexander in Asia Minor. Then Darius gathered a new army estimated as high as half a million men to defend his vast empire at Arbela. The Persian monarch depended for victory on his cavalry and those bronze-





Greek warriors—about 330 B.C.



armored chariots which were the tanks of the ancient world. Thousands of foot soldiers also made up the enormous host, but it could scarcely be said that they were infantry. Serfs have never been good infantry material, and the Persian foot consisted of a miserable Oriental rabble flogged into action.

Darius was confident, however, that he possessed a new weapon too terrible for flesh and blood to bear—a delusion that has repeated itself in later ages. Ranged in front of his cavalry on a level plain was a line of chariots with stout scythes protruding on either side. After the Persian archers on both wings began the action with a "barrage" of arrows, these chariots were to charge at a gallop and with their wicked blades make mincemeat of the opposing ranks.

Alexander's staff officers urged a desperate night attack as the only hope of salvation against such a numerical superiority. But the 25-year-

old leader over-ruled them and drew up his 7,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry on ground chosen by Darius.

Two mutually supporting kinds of infantry have been found essential in some military ages for a combination of shock and missile effect. This was the case in the invading army. Both hands being needed to grasp a long spear, the heavy infantry of the phalanx was grouped with light infantry using such missile weapons as slings, darts, arrows and javelins.

Alexander drew up his army with the phalanx in the center and the light infantry and cavalry on either wing. He beat the enemy to the punch by opening the battle with a swift, oblique advance of the light infantry on his right. Darius countered with his arrow attack and char-

iot charge. But Alexander's right wing was already far enough forward to take the Persian chariots in flank. The Greek light infantry poured in javelins, darts and arrows. And the chariots piled up in an insane tangle of frantic horses and locked wheels, with the scythes doing more hurt to friend than foe.

The failure of the "irresistible" weapon plunged the incoherent Persian host into disorder. Alexander marched his phalanx straight through the opposing left-center and his cavalry rode down the fugitives. Darius managed to escape but was deposed and assassinated a few months later. Meanwhile, his conquerors continued a military adventure which took them as far as modern India and Afghanistan without a defeat.

While Alexander's successors were scrambling for the empire left at his death, another war power was rising in the west. The early Romans took several sound beatings before conquering their neighbors in Italy, but they learned from defeat. And they created in the legion one of the most marvelous infantry forces of all time.

Unlike the phalanx, which went into battle as a solid unit, the new Roman formation was made up of separate companies known as maniples and consisting of 10 ranks and 12 files, a total of 120 men. They were drawn up checkerwise in three lines so that the maniples of the second line could move up into the intervals of the first, or the first line could pull back into the second. The third line was made up of youths serving as light infantry with missile weapons, combined with equal numbers of veterans near retirement age who carried long spears.

One maniple of each line, from front to rear, formed a cohort or Roman battalion. Twenty cohorts were usually reinforced by 900 cavalry and supporting units of slingers and archers to make up a legion of about 10,000 men.

The two famous weapons of the legion were a short, heavy cut-and-thrust sword and a seven-foot javelin that could be used either for throwing or thrusting. These fighting tools were employed with practiced skill by fiercely patriotic citizen-soldiers who owed military service from the ages of 17 to 60.

The Roman equivalent of "boot camp" was probably as rugged an apprenticeship as recruits have ever endured. Stern drillmasters put Roman youths through all the exertions of war with weapons weighing twice as much as those used in battle. Terrific loads were carried during long marches invariably followed by the back-breaking toil of throwing up earthworks for a camp.

It was the opinion of modern military theorist Colonel Ardant du Picq that the Romans deliberately made the recruit's life so miserable that he would take out his resentment against the foe. Certain it is, at any rate, that Roman discipline aimed to make or break a youth. And yet, military service was considered a privilege in the warlike republic, with slaves and bound men being barred from the ranks.

After seeking out the enemy, the legion seized the offensive whenever possible. Youths of the third line opened the action by swarming out in front as skirmishers who harassed their opponents with darts, arrows and javelins. After they retired to the rear to take care of the wounded, the first and second lines advanced at a quickstep. Pausing only long enough to hurl their javelins with deadly aim, they plunged in with the sword before the enemy had time to recover from his confusion.

If repulsed, the Romans returned again and again to the assault. And if forced back on the defensive, the two lines of maniples combined in a phalanx reinforced by the spearmen of the third line.

The Romans, like the Greeks, depended more on shields than body armor for protection. They considered a good offense the best defense and preferred not to be too hampered in their movements.

In 281 B.C. the legion was challenged by Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, whose realm comprised the present area of northern Greece and Albania, and who aspired to be a new Alexander. The Italian peninsula seemed to him a likely area for conquest; and, like Darius, he believed that he had an irresistible weapon. Roman infantry, reasoned Pyrrhus, could never retain any fighting spirit against the strange and terrifying spectacle of elephants charging through the ranks.




Hannibal Army-

The Epirotic monarch defeated two Roman armies which marched out to meet him after he landed in southern Italy. But he was disappointed in the expectation that his war elephants would scatter the Roman infantry. And his own losses were so heavy at the battle of Heraclea that the term "Pyrrhic victory" denotes to this day a costly success.

The Romans hamstringed the elephants with their swords, or they waved flaming brands until the huge beasts stampeded back through their own lines. The Romans also demonstrated at the enemy's expense the age-old tactical lesson that cavalry is not effective against unbroken infantry.

At the battle of Beneventum the invaders were so decisively beaten that they departed from Roman soil. But Rome remained at peace only a decade. In 234 B.C. the First Punic War was the beginning of a death grapple with Carthage, the trading and seafaring oligarchy which dominated the African shore of the Mediterranean.

The sea had been an alien element to Roman warriors. Yet they



Hannibal's army—elephants, Africans and half-naked Gauls

grimly began the creation of a new navy, using as a model a Carthaginian quinquireme that had been driven ashore in a storm.

Naval tactics had changed but little since Salamis. Four or five banks of oars had replaced the three banks of the trireme, but human sinews still supplied the motive power for complex maneuvers leading up to bombardments with war engines or ramming with the huge bronze spurs protruding from the prows. Boarding tactics were considered a last resort, though every warship had its quota of Marines trained for hand-to-hand combat or amphibious landings.

Fighting of this sort suited the Roman genius for war, and the republic placed its dependence in soldiers of the sea. The new Roman quinquiremes were built with fighting turrets fore and aft, to contain bands of Marines. For their benefit, a huge iron hook known as the *corvus* was mounted on the prow to provide a means of grappling an enemy vessel and dropping a bridge to board her.

Carthaginian navigation was su-

perior, but sea-going Roman infantry tactics prevailed in the battle of Mylae off the coast of Sicily in 260 B.C. This victory gave the Romans command of the Mediterranean until the enemy tried again, four years later, with an enormous fleet of 330 warships. Although outnumbered, the Romans attacked off the African coast in a wedge-shaped formation, and at the battle of Ecnomus their Marines won another triumph in which 56 Carthaginian vessels were sunk or captured. Carthage sued for peace after Roman boarding tactics prevailed again in the sea battle of Aegusa. But it was necessary to pay a large indemnity and cede Sicily to the victors.

Astonishing as it was that Rome should win on the sea, the paradox was completed in the Second Punic War when Carthage gained a succession of land victories. The Iberian peninsula, as a Carthaginian colony, became the assembly area for the motley host recruited by Hannibal for the invasion of Rome. Iberian heavy infantry, Balearic slingers, African javelin men, half-naked Gauls and fierce Libyans in the light

infantry—these were the troops that debouched from the Alps in the autumn of 218 B.C. to strike at the heart of a republic which controlled the sea.

Such were the hardships that only 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry survived out of the army of 46,000 men that had left Spain. Few Carthaginians could have been found among the rank and file, for the rich merchant state preferred to hire warriors. Only the genius of a Hannibal could have created a formidable military machine out of mercenaries speaking a dozen barbaric tongues. But he soon demonstrated his ability by destroying a Roman army in the battle of the Trebia, inflicting losses of 30,000 slain. A few months later, while Rome was still stunned from this disaster, Hannibal surprised another army on the shore of Lake Trasimene, and only about 6,000 of the original 30,000 legionaries escaped with their lives.

● EFFECTIVE AS the republic's military system was, it had ignored the factor of command. So strong was the Roman distrust of dictatorship that authority was grudgingly granted to two elected consuls who commanded the main army on alternate days. The shortcomings of this procedure had been redeemed in the past by hard infantry fighting, but the genius of Hannibal was baffling. As a temporary solution, the Roman senate put Fabius in command with instructions to avoid decisive actions and risk only harassing operations. The cautious tactics of this general have been commemorated in the adjective "Fabian," but Rome found it shameful to shun battle while Hannibal ravaged and plundered at will. At last the army was built up to a strength of 85,000—about double the numbers of the invaders—and given permission to fight.

The command was shared by a prudent consul, Paullus, and a hot-headed colleague, Varro. Hannibal shrewdly lured the Romans to their destruction on Varro's days of authority. And in the summer of 216 B.C. he gained a victory at Cannae that has become a synonym for battle of annihilation and double envelopment.

The Carthaginian leader took advantage of Varro's impetuosity by pretending that his center, com-

posed of heavy infantry, was being forced back by the Roman attack. Varro, never suspecting a trap, continued to advance until he was half enveloped by the light infantry and cavalry of Hannibal's wings. Even the Roman superiority in numbers became a handicap as the legionaries raised the victory shout and crowded in too closely to use their swords and javelins. Not until then did Hannibal strike. Both of his wings closed in on the mass of helpless Romans, and the Carthaginian center contributed to the slaughter. Only about 15,000 of Varro's men escaped from a disaster in which the Roman slain outnumbered Hannibal's entire force.

The republic was saved in the end by building a backfire of military genius in the person of the young general known to history as Scipio Africanus. In 206 B.C., after the victor of Cannae had been ravaging Italy for 12 years, Scipio carried the war to enemy territory by invading Spain. There he defeated Hannibal's brother Mago in the decisive battle of Ilipa. Three years later he

landed on the shores of Carthage, making it necessary for Hannibal to return from Italy for the defense of his homeland.

The hastily raised Carthaginian force of mercenaries could not cope with the veteran Roman infantry, and Hannibal went down to his first major defeat in the battle of Zama. Only fugitives were left of his army, and again Carthage was compelled to accept ruinous Roman terms. Her great general ended his life by suicide long later as an exile in Asia Minor; and in the Third Punic War the Romans captured Carthage, slaughtered the inhabitants and razed the great city to the ground. Seldom in history has total war been carried to such extremes.

Rome had learned the uses of generalship, and during the civil war era Julius Caesar led the legions to brilliant victories in Africa, Gaul, Spain, Egypt and Asia Minor. Other talented commanders maintained the world rule of the Roman Empire after the republic collapsed, but the quality of the cohorts gradually deteriorated as time went on.


In all ages of war a nation's military strength is on the wane when the infantry expects too much from the supporting arms. And by the third century A.D. the cohorts were depending more and more on cavalry action and bombardments by war engines as the substitute for infantry attack. Roman prestige helped the "hard shell and soft kernel" of the Empire to survive until 378 A.D. Then at the battle of Adrianople the flight of the Roman cavalry on both wings left the huddled infantry a prey to the Goths, and the Emperor Valens perished in a massacre which left 40,000 corpses on the field.

Rome never recovered from the disaster. A generation later the barbarians over-ran Italy and sacked the imperial city. And as the Dark Ages closed in over Europe, military techniques went into decline along with other arts and sciences.

Although the cavalry fighters among the barbarians won the richest spoils, they were first to be conquered in their turn. It was the hardy infantry fighters who survived—the Franks, the Angles and the



Waves of Moorish horsemen dashed themselves to pieces



The Vikings—infantry tactics with loot the objective

Saxons. By the year 732, with Europe facing the threat of a Moslem conquest, the Franks had emerged into a loosely knit kingdom comprising the present area of France and southern Germany. When the Moors pushed northward, after their conquest of Spain, they were opposed near Poitiers by Charles Martel, the champion of Christendom. Forming his Frankish infantry into a solid square, he stood firm while the waves of invading horsemen dashed themselves to pieces. That night the Moors withdrew, never again to trouble Europe.

It was to be the last great infantry victory for centuries. The long age of cavalry supremacy had begun, for Charlemagne made it his aim in the next century to create a Frankish host of armored cavalry. Mobility was essential to oppose the mounted barbarian raiders who harassed the frontiers; and cavalry shock tactics had been given an impetus by the recent invention of the stirrup, which was unknown in ancient warfare.

It is a truism of history, however, that social conditions have as much influence in shaping tactics as purely military considerations. And so wretched was the poverty of feudal Europe that only the lords and masters could afford armor and weapons. The serfs who fought on foot degenerated into mere drudges of war who were often armed only with clubs.

The consequences of such a system were summed up by a nineteenth century military historian,

Colonel E. M. Lloyd, in his *History of Infantry*: "When men are slumbering, careless or brutalized, it [the infantry] is abject and despised; and it only shows what it is capable of when privilege and inequality have been replaced by a social system which pays more attention to the dignity of man."

It is noteworthy that Charlemagne's mailed horsemen were able to defeat the mounted Lombards and conquer all northern Italy in a single campaign. But it took the Franks from 774 to 799 to subdue the pagan Saxons, who were primitive infantry fighters.

The seaborne Vikings who raided Europe in the next century also demonstrated that infantry tactics were not yet dead. Sailing up the rivers, they sacked castles and abbeys; and when pursued by the feudal horsemen, the plunderers took a terrible toll with their axes and swords. In time the Norsemen learned to use horses for transport, but they remained infantry fighters who succeeded to the extent of sacking London and besieging Paris.

Most of the raiders were interested only in loot. But a permanent Viking lodgment was made in Normandy which has had a profound influence on the history of the English-speaking peoples.

The Normans of the year 1066 had departed so far from the tactics of their Viking ancestors that they had a name as the best horsemen of France. They did not neglect the infantry, however, when they landed in England under Duke William.

For the invading force at the battle of Hastings was drawn up in two lines of infantry archers with mailed horsemen in the rear.

Contemporary estimates of 60,000 Normans were doubtless much too large, since King Harold had the advantage in numbers. England, due to isolation, was Europe's last stronghold of the national levy of foot. Heavy infantry, armed with the axe, were massed deeply in the center, and the wings consisted of unarmored light infantry, chiefly archers and spearmen.

THE ENGLISH HELD a strong defensive position on high ground with a wood to the rear and a gentle slope in front. William opened the battle with an infantry advance. The defenders not only repulsed this effort but followed so rashly in pursuit that their disorder was punished by a Norman cavalry counter-attack. But here it may be noted that if the Dark Ages placed too much emphasis on cavalry, the English erred too much in the opposite direction at Hastings by relying mainly on infantry. The ideal in all ages of war has been the balanced combination of infantry and supporting arms.

When William's infantry advanced a second time, therefore, it was with orders to feign flight and draw the English out again. The stratagem succeeded so well that the light infantry of both English wings was cut to pieces by Norman horsemen. This left only the massed axemen of Harold's center, who were harassed from a distance by arrows shot in curving flight, so that shields offered small protection. Even so, the defenders managed to hurl back several cavalry attacks. Then Harold fell with a mortal wound and the remnants of his army were ridden down by the invaders.

Hastings has been cited as one of the great cavalry victories of history. It would seem more fitting, however, to describe it as the triumph of a well-balanced infantry and cavalry attack over an incoherent infantry host. At any rate, the England resulting from this conquest was destined with poetic justice to produce a race of freemen which would end the supremacy of the mailed horseman and restore the infantry to its ancient glory.

US & MC


(To be continued next month)

Get with them

*Mobility or a
'Gentleman's war'?
Battalion Commanders
must forego the
latter—else lose
vital control*



By Major G. P. Averill





THE SUN SINKS LOW OVER THE western hills. Shadows fill the valleys and slide up the hillsides, and some 2,000 meters forward of the battalion observation post our fighter planes are silhouetted against the evening sky as they go in for the final close-support run of the day.

The familiar rag-tearing sound of the aircraft machine guns drifts back through the chill air long after the glowing tracers wink out against the far hillside. The racket of the machine guns is punctuated periodically by the distance-muffled explosions of fragmentation bombs and, through the battery commander scope lenses, the napalm tanks can be seen hurtling through the air to burst in a sheet of flame against the hill. As the flame dies out and the

black smoke weaves its way upward, the scope reveals tiny figures in camouflaged helmets scurrying forward, only to turn and dash back seconds later, some falling on the way.

In the observation post the commander's radio crackles. The operator acknowledges and passes the hand-set to the officer. A message comes in from Able Six reporting that in spite of the accurate air strike he cannot take the assigned objective. He is hotly engaged by the enemy to his front and flanks, and can't break contact to establish proper night defensive positions. As soon as this message has been acknowledged, Baker Six comes up on the net to report that he is held up by heavy fire, is not on the objective and cannot make physical contact

with Able Company. The battalion commander "Rogers" for both transmissions and turns to the S-3. In the failing light they squint at the situation map.

On the map, the terrain and the plotted location of known enemy positions do not seem to indicate that the companies can be in as much trouble as they say . . . but the stream of casualties coming back seems to verify the reports. The battalion commander shakes his head, speaks to the S-3 and, picking up his helmet, moves down the hill in the direction of the command post. It is too late in the day to go forward for a personal check of the situation—it looks like a rough night and he hopes the companies can hold out.

In the meantime there is a map

study to make, the staff must be briefed and the order must be drafted for tomorrow's continuation of the attack. Right now he had better call regiment and give the colonel the bad news.

There are probably two reactions to the preceding paragraphs: (1) that's the way it goes sometimes and (2) the example is overdrawn—commanders don't operate that way in the field, and if they do they are in the minority.

The first reaction cannot be refuted . . . sure enough, that's the way it goes sometimes. In the case of the second reaction, the record shows, unfortunately, that far too many battalions have been commanded from a command post or observation post located out of physical and sometimes sight contact with the front-line units.

Too many poor tactical decisions have been made under such circumstances. We in the Marine Corps did not fall into this state of affairs; we talked ourselves into it as we have talked ourselves into justification of other errors, such as overreliance on supporting arms which seem to dominate the scene at present. How did command from the command post come about, and what is being done about rectifying it? Many readers of the *GAZETTE* know the answer. By putting our cards on the table it is hoped that we can come up with a workable solution.

In the schools system of the Marine Corps and throughout the Fleet Marine Force there has been a tendency to make a mysterious thing of the command post. As a result of this tendency a legend has grown.

The legend tells us that the command post is the inner sanctum—a large, unwieldy, inflexible organization which moves by motor vehicle; that it is set up at a physical location for purposes of being reported to higher echelon; that it's an area in which the battalion commander gathers his staff together in a safe place, sets up his situation map, camouflages his tents and vehicles, lays in his wire communications, comes up on his radio nets at the proper time, gets a hot cup of coffee and settles down to command. The legend pictures a very nice set-up for fighting a gentleman's war, and it has been taken for the gospel truth

on more occasions than one cares to remember.

The pertinent field manuals break down the legend of the command post in detail. They state that the command post is a communications center and that it can be broken down into a forward and a rear echelon when the commander is on the move. Also set down is a list of the staff members the commander may take to the observation post, and instructions on reporting the closing of the old and the opening of the new command post.

These instructions are valid and furnish an excellent guide to command post functioning, but nearly all of the instructions set forth are based on the assumption that the commander moves where and when the command post moves. They should be based on the assumption that the command post follow the commander and that it be so equipped and organized. The CP should move in the commander's wake, so to speak, and it should set up so that the commander may direct and control the efforts of the assaulting rifle companies at close range.

How can such a system be devised? And once devised, how can it be utilized effectively? A system of this sort has been used on many occasions by units of the 1st Marine Division during recent combat operations. It has been accomplished by

Up with his companies



moving a group of staff officers and communications personnel forward with the commander in the attack, and by leaving the supply and administrative echelon, heavy in materials and equipment, to follow in the trace of the battalion, either immediately or when routes are open to it.

This group of staff officers and communicators has been called a forward command post, a combat command post, an observation-command group and a command group. In any case it is nothing more than a skeletonized, conventional command post allowing the commander the maximum of control with a minimum of personnel and equipment. The group can vary in size from 15 to 40 people depending on the needs and wishes of the commander. A typical command group follows:

- Battalion Commander
- Runner
- Radio Operator
- S-3 Officer
- Section Member
- Radio Operator
- S-2 Officer or Section Member
- Radio Operator
- Communication Team (Radio and wiremen)
- S-1 Representative
- S-4 Representative
- Medical Officer
- Corpsman
- Tactical Air Control Party
- Artillery Liaison Team
- Naval Gunfire Liaison Team
- 4.2-inch Mortar Liaison
- Radio Operator
- 81mm Mortar Forward Observer
- Radio Operator

The command group described above contains representatives of all the unit staff sections and includes members of all the supporting arms sections. Such a large group often will not be necessary, and one or more of these sections may be dispensed with depending on the particular operation involved. For instance, when the battalion is operating out of range of the naval gun, there will be no need for the naval gunfire liaison officer or his team. The tactical situation alone will determine the composition of the group.

The command group as an entity is employed when the terrain through which the battalion must attack is particularly rugged and



Cots, Coleman lanterns and hot coffee—but no mobility

broken, and when routes of communication are scarce or non-existent. In terrain such as this there have been cases where the assault elements of the battalion, including the command group, were separated from the supply and administrative echelon by great distances for periods as long as 10 days.

It is during such periods that the command group can be utilized to its fullest extent. Then the commander may remain on the ground for which his companies are fighting and still have at arm's length all elements of his staff needed to conduct full-scale offensive operations. By positioning his staff on commanding ground, where it has observation over the front and is able to facilitate and co-ordinate the tactical movement of the rifle companies, the commander is free to move about and to make his presence felt where it is most needed.

What is the normal employment of the command group? In the movement to contact, the command group moves with one of the leading companies or may move at the head of the reserve company. Once contact with the enemy has been established

and one or more of the rifle companies is engaged, the command group will be moved forward by the commander to a position where observation over the contested area can be gained.

☛ HERE THE GROUP sets up its equipment, and the various staff sections commence routine operations. From this position the S-3 can best aid the commander in the control of the assault echelon. Also, from this vantage point personnel of supporting elements usually can observe most of the targets taken under fire by the forward observers. At times, because of superior observation, they may be able to bring fire to bear on targets of opportunity undiscovered by the forward observers.

Once enemy resistance has been overcome, and upon order of the commander, the command group proceeds forward with the rifle companies until contact is again made with enemy forces and the battle joined. The group operates in this manner throughout the hours of daylight. When night defensive positions are assumed by the rifle companies, the command group enters

the defensive area of the reserve company or one of the companies on the line. The staff operates from this location during hours of darkness.

FM 100-5 states that during the decisive phase of the battle the place of the commander is near the critical point of action. By no stretch of the imagination can the confines of a tent-filled command or observation post, located in excess of a thousand meters from the assault companies, be construed as near the critical point of action.

Jeeps are fine when there are roads to run them on, and tents with cots installed are undeniably comfortable. But when the roads run out and the canvas has to be man-carried, it is time to forget about commanding from the comforts of a command post—it's time to get up with the rifle companies.

By using the command group and by moving it with him, the commander has all the tools of his trade in his grasp, and he can place himself where he can best control the course of action and exert his leadership. If he takes his staff with him he then can carry out his primary mission . . . *command!* USMC

COMPANY



Sure the Corps can get by for a while, but look to
the future — a valuable relationship is being lost

OFFICER

MSgt Charles V. Crumb

SHORTAGE

A YOUNG LIEUTENANT WHO HAD almost completed his required service explained, "I chose to do my service in the Marine Corps because the procurement officer assured me that, 'In the Marines an officer works with men, not machines.' In the last six months it seems that I have done little but sit on court-martial, survey and promotion boards and the like. I like the way the Marines work and fight, but this continual round of paperwork is not to my liking. I'm for the outside."

Upon closer interrogation I learned that there were only two commissioned officers in his company, himself and a captain of considerable service. The officer paperwork incident to the housekeeping of his unit, which under normal conditions would have been shouldered by four or five lieutenants without any undue hardship to any certain one, seemed appallingly heavy when carried alone. The victim, in consequence, was planning to leave the service of his choice, although the other phases of duty were much to his liking. Telling him that these conditions were not normal could not dissuade this young officer from his determination to resign, for he smilingly rebuffed my recruiting efforts with the remark that there was no relief in sight.

In many of the stateside units of the FMF, a sizeable shortage of company-grade officers exists. In fact, in many rifle companies the strength of

officers is below half of what the T/O calls for. Many Marines shrug off this deficiency with a, "So what, we're short a few lieutenants and captains. Any good Staff NCO can handle a platoon, and the first sergeant and company gunny can handle the company as long as we have someone to sign the papers."

The writer feels that this viewpoint is short-sighted and in error for reasons which I will discuss at length in this article. In the interests of clarity, the effects of the company-grade officer shortage on the problems of leadership, training, and discipline in the Marine Corps will be treated under two headings: the immediate and the far reaching. The more obvious, the immediate effects, will be considered first.

The afore-mentioned shortage is responsible for the fact that, in some cases, second lieutenants with very limited experience are company commanders. A very serious young lieutenant just out of Basic School with no previous active service was greeted, upon joining the FMF, with the job of company commander. His training throughout had pointed toward beginning his active career as a platoon commander. This very conscientious young man was approaching what he thought was going to be his job with somewhat more than average trepidation. Imagine his consternation and surprise when he was informed by the battalion adjutant that he was to

take over a company. The job, big enough for a highly-talented individual with the necessary training and background, loomed in enormous proportions over the consciousness of the young lieutenant.

Feeling like an animal in a power wheel, he learned at the most furious rate in his life. Two weeks after he received his command, the battalion took part in a field problem of some importance, upon the completion of which he was exhausted mentally and physically. He recovered and went on to do an increasingly better job until he was relieved by a more senior lieutenant, but the fact that the Marine Corps is an organization in which sometime in the future he might again be placed in an important job for which he had not been properly prepared has obviated any possibility of his staying with us.

These two examples indicate how the shortage of company-grade officers leads to conditions which discourage our young lieutenants from integrating or extending their required length of service. The deficiency thereby increases upon itself.

Although sometimes we think, or like to think, that our Staff NCOs are well qualified as tactical leaders and tactical teachers, the truth is that many of them have not had the necessary formal training to give them a sound basis for troop leading and tactical instruction. Some

of our NCOs have prepared themselves for the job of platoon commander by virtue of study and careful observation, or by attending some of the unit schools. Others are no better prepared than by the hit-or-miss school of experience and indifferent observation. The results, then, of placing an indifferently trained NCO in the job of platoon leader are sometimes two-fold. Either you have an improperly conducted field problem from which only a portion of the possible lessons may be learned, or you get a general dislocation of the operation of the parent unit. Also, the lower ranking men may learn erroneous methods or techniques.

When we think of the capabilities of our Staff NCOs, we should remember that most of them are well-qualified to supervise their units in housekeeping and training details, and to carry out the policies and instructions of the officer-in-charge. However, they have not received the formal training which would put them on a par with our well-schooled officers in the direction of tactical exercises and tactical instruction. By virtue of the above argument and example, I think we can safely conclude that our field training will not be as effective when we are operating with a marked shortage of company-grade officers.

In a preceding paragraph we dis-

cussed the effect on the officer himself of the paperwork overload carried by the company officer. Now we shall discuss the effect this overload has on the paperwork. In one unit I know of, commanding officers have issued orders that the work incident to these housekeeping duties will be performed after regular working hours. This step was taken to insure that the officers were with their units supervising the field training. The results of these orders can easily be imagined: delay in execution, which is sometimes serious enough to affect a man's promotion, pay or assignment; and indifferent execution. The work performed by a young officer who has spent an arduous day in the field and feels that long, exacting hours of paperwork drudgery after hours is a pernicious invasion of his hours of rest and relaxation, is not likely to be of the best caliber. We all realize that paperwork is secondary to combat efficiency, but a unit which is improperly administered in respect to pay, promotion, discipline, supply and messing is very likely to develop a state of being among the troops which will definitely affect the combat efficiency of the unit.

Down through the years, the officer-enlisted man relationship has been one of the factors in the success of the Marine Corps in the fulfillment of its many missions. In the

Marine Corps, as well as in other branches of the service, the granting of privilege goes hand-in-hand with the delegation of responsibility. However, in the Marine Corps it has been tradition for the company-grade officer to shoulder more than an equal share of danger, hardship and privation while in the field. A civilian observer related his surprise when noting a Marine unit being fed in the field. First the men lined up and received their rations, next the NCOs received their chow, and only after a visual check to assure themselves that all the enlisted men were eating did the officers file up to get their food. Field officers, in their advice to junior officers, will impress them with the necessity of seeing to the needs of their men both in the field and in the barracks before they tend to their own needs.

What is most important of all in this relationship, is the sharing of danger. In no other military organization has the right to lead been better demonstrated on the battlefield by company-grade officers than in the Marine Corps. The casualties in this group were so high near the end of World War II that in some units recommendations for battle citations for officers had to show that it was necessary for the officer to have committed the act of heroism, that he did not expose himself unnecessarily,



"First the men line up . . ."

and that no one else could have done the job. With so few officers in evidence in FMF units in the states, it is impossible to orient the younger Marines and the younger officers in the ways of this very valuable officer-enlisted man relationship. This is resulting in problems in leadership and discipline now, and will continue to do so in the future.

We have considered some of the immediate effects of the company-grade officer shortage. There are undoubtedly many others. In some ways they might also be placed in the category of far-reaching effects. Now we shall consider those effects which will only be more telling on the future training, leadership and discipline in the Marine Corps.

FIRST, OFFICER PROCUREMENT. It is only natural that a young man who is trying to choose his branch of service will go for advice to someone approximately his own age who has had actual experience in the service. A young officer who has recently separated himself from the Marine Corps because he thought he was overworked or placed in a job for which he had not been properly prepared, will probably not be very enthusiastic about recommending the Marine Corps. A young man who would not have stayed in the Marine Corps in any case, but who has been favorably impressed by the normal orderly operation of our outfit, would be an asset to procurement. The lack of company-grade officers will then not only compound itself but will make the fulfillment of officer procurement quotas even more difficult.

Next, let's discuss the case of a young lieutenant just out of Basic School who has been assigned to a rifle platoon commanded by a very capable technical sergeant for the last 14 months. What may be the thoughts of the men in the ranks? Or even possibly the Gunny himself? Just this. That the lieutenant is an extra wheel, that he is only filling a spot in the T/O and is actually not needed. The results of these thoughts, if the unit gets into combat before the young lieutenant has a chance to dispel them, could be tragic.

Finally, the chain of responsibility



"The best combination you can get . . ."

ity and supervision allowed for by the T/O is not an arbitrary decision on the part of some un-enlightened desk-bound individual in HQMC, but is the result of years of study and experiment. It has been found that a top non-commissioned officer with years of experience working with and for a physically fit young officer of a good formal liberal education and a sound basic training in the military field is the best combination you can get for the leading, supervision, training and direction of small units. By the very nature of the division of duties, the work accomplished by the NCO partner in this combination is the more obvious. For this reason it sometimes seems that the other partner is less important. This illusion is made even stronger when the unit operates minus the services of the commissioned partner month after month without any apparent ill-effects. Then comes the day when the shortage of junior officers is alleviated so that all the platoons can be assigned the commissioned partner that the

T/O calls for. The sum total of the effort required to re-educate and reorient the men of the units, to reallocate the supervisory and leadership problems, and generally restore the commissioned officer to the team, will be tremendous. The time and effort required for the officer partner to reinstate himself will further delay the hour at which time we can safely say that the stateside FMF units have recovered from the present-day shortage of company-grade officers.

The writer has avoided any conclusions as to the causes of or the remedies for this shortage. It is confidently felt that all possible measures are being considered to alleviate the situation by the people who are directly concerned with officer procurement. This article is written with the hope that some of the effects of the deficiency might better be contended with once they are brought to the attention of the people who are most directly concerned with the future of our Marine Corps: the officers and Staff NCOs. USMC

By 1stLt Peter Braestrup



OUTPOST WA

This was no man's land—high, bare humps of ground . . .

Shielding against surprise . . . and held against fantastic odds





WARFARE



• WHILE MY PARTICULAR BASIC School class was acquiring its military education at Quantico we seldom heard the term "static war." The Marine Corps lexicon excluded such passive concepts and the Korea alumni among our instructors illustrated tactics lectures with references to rigorous offensive combat—the Pusan perimeter, the Inchon-Seoul operation, the Chosin Reservoir. Static warfare was yet to come, and with it a host of new problems and techniques. It remained for us, among others, to adapt traditional Marine Corps aggressiveness and know-how to this new situation and to pass on the knowledge gained.

That static warfare supplies the perfect antithesis of the war Marines prefer to fight is obvious. Less obvious is the fact that the stalemate

in Korea demanded as much (though in different ways) as did the fast-moving earlier campaigns. Nowhere was this more obvious than on the combat outposts forward of the main line of resistance.

When the 1st Marine Division was on the move, outposts were of relatively minor importance. They were usually of fire team or squad size, sent out at dusk to screen the company or the battalion perimeter. There was nothing permanent about these outposts—if they were hit during the night they were to withdraw to the parent unit and aid in its defense. Next morning the entire outfit would saddle up and move out toward the enemy, leaving its foxholes behind.

As a result of the long stalemate in Korea the outpost took on a new

and significant role. Like the rest of the 8th Army, the 1st Mar Div took its turn on a solidly dug-in line. But the Chinese also dug in.

Both sides used artillery—plenty of it. We had tactical air, mobility and better communications, while they had the high ground, more men and defense in considerable depth. Between the lines was a rugged strip that no one owned but which both sides tried to control.

This was no-man's-land. Varying in width from 600 to 2,500 yards, scarred by months of shelling, crisscrossed by protective wire and strewn with mines, it was where the war was fought—largely at night.

Rising like islands from the barren rice paddies and low irregular ridgelines were high, bare humps of ground which dominated the contested terrain. These humps of ground were manned as outposts by men of the front line rifle companies who had a mission of denying the enemy the use of them, shielding our own MLR against surprise attack and furnishing our forward observers a view of the enemy's backyard.

FROM THESE vantage points enemy troops, bunkers and weapons emplacements were spotted and friendly fire directed to destroy them. At night the outpost was a buffer, a listening post and a convenient rallying point for patrols and raiding parties. To lose an outpost was often to lose vital terrain overlooking the MLR. These bits of battered real estate were not surrendered lightly.

As the most forward element of the battalion's defense and as a base for its offensive operations, the outpost was a primary concern of the battalion commander and his staff. Close-in defensive fires were frequently registered by the forward observers, and harassing and interdictory fires were also controlled from this point. The S-2 and S-3 routed reconnaissance patrols with an eye on terrain not covered by these advanced positions. Raids and night attacks were planned to make full use of the outpost's potential as a base of fire, forward command post and aid station. In most cases these outposts were under heavy enemy pressure and battalion had pre-arranged plans for their recapture or neutralization in the event they were seized by the Chinese.

The responsibility for manning, supplying and fortifying a combat outpost was delegated to the front line rifle company commander. He had to weigh its demands against those of his extended portion of the MLR, while obtaining maximum use of his resources in both efforts as well as fulfilling battalion's nightly patrol requirements.

Where the outpost was close to the MLR and largely safe from enemy

headquarters personnel, and pack trains of Korean Service Corps laborers were dispatched so as to obtain maximum protection from friendly patrols already in no-man's-land. Timbers, sandbags and engineer equipment were priority items for the fortifications which were continually improved no matter how often the trenches and bunkers were flattened by enemy mortar fire.

Vital to the defense was a well-



Outposts . . . like ships at sea

fire, the strain on the rifle company was less severe; but when the advanced position was 800 to 1,000 yards distant, under continuous enemy bombardment and subject to encirclement or assault each night, the company commander was forced to employ every device to prevent both the exhaustion of his men and the success of enemy tactics. It was not unusual the summer and autumn of 1952 to find two-thirds of a company forward of the MLR during darkness, either manning its outposts or protecting them.

Direct-fire weapons on the MLR were sighted-in to furnish long-range support in case of attack, and the company commander co-ordinated his own mortar fires with those of higher units as further support for this forward echelon.

To gather and transport gear requested by the outpost, the company commander usually designated a special supply team out of company

coordinated communications net between the MLR and the outposts. The company commander was responsible for the operation of this net, and with action taking place largely at night and with emphasis on the use of supporting arms, his security could be endangered by communication failures.

Equally important was the company's readiness for action in the event the outpost was attacked or over-run. Quick countermoves, which were planned beforehand on a company level, could frequently take care of a threat while battalion was still gathering its forces.

During the stalemate, the company commander in Korea controlled a far-flung little empire consisting of his section of the MLR, his patrols and his outpost. The outpost "colony" constituted a valuable shield and an isolated satellite which had to be fed and assisted.

Command of the combat outpost

was usually assigned to a company officer with each company rotating its officers. Where the outpost was small and close to the MLR, an NCO was in command. Where the company rotated officers between the MLR and two outposts, there were times when even the exec took his turn in the boondocks.

When other missions didn't conflict it was best to keep the integrity of units assigned to this duty intact. Experiments in equalizing the burden by drawing machine gun and rifle squads from different platoons within the company proved unsatisfactory. The combat outpost functioned best when the NCOs and men all came from the same rifle platoon and its attached units.

It was found that the garrison of any outpost should be held to the minimum required for its security. During the heavy mortar barrages and night warfare that prevailed, overcrowding of small exposed hill positions caused unnecessary confusion and unnecessary casualties. It was seldom that we found it necessary to man a position with more than 50 men. Its defense against all-out attack was dependent upon supporting arms more than on the number of rifles present. A typical garrison located well forward of the MLR was made up of a lieutenant in charge, a platoon sergeant, a radioman, a corpsman, a mortar FO team, a reinforced rifle squad, a machine gun squad and four antitank assault men who also acted as machine gunners. If possible, replacements came from that portion of the platoon left behind on the MLR.

If action is resumed again in Korea and the situation is again the same as it was before the truce was signed, the new second lieutenant assigned to command a combat outpost for the first time should not hesitate to spread open a map and question his skipper.


The neophyte should be concerned with enemy activity with respect to his outpost; friendly activity in the same area; locations of friendly supporting arms and the SOP for using them; alternate routes for casualty evacuation, supply trains and reinforcements; supply SOP; existing plans for developing the position; codes and communications and the over-all company and battalion defense and counter-attack plan.

In most instances the lieutenant will have been well-briefed by his CO and the battalion S-2 and S-3, but he should check to see that all the questions in his mind have been answered. In addition, if he is to command troops other than his own, he should endeavor to meet and discuss the situation with the NCOs in charge, for once on the outpost he will be too busy for get-acquainted chats.

When a relief is to take place the lieutenant will precede the relieving troops by 24 hours. This period can be profitably employed to learn the existing routine, where supplies are kept, the location of machine gun and BAR positions, how rations are handled and the liabilities and assets of the position.

The initial visual reconnaissance should be made with the map at hand and the FO at one's elbow. Once the lieutenant relieves his predecessor he can utilize the knowledge gained to improve and maintain the outpost as he sees fit.

Commanding a unit of this type is



*A task at hand—
too busy for chats*

a far more independent task than running a platoon on the MLR. It demands the utmost of the officer concerned with respect to initiative, patience, imagination and courage. Like a ship at sea, the combat outpost is largely isolated. It is the man in charge who determines whether it can survive.

If the position is under enemy observation, care must be taken to keep the majority of the garrison under cover at all times. Only a few men are needed on watch during the day because no-man's-land affords little concealment. At night, the watch must be increased, but the number of men in exposed positions should be kept as low as possible to keep down casualties from sniper and sporadic mortar fire. Weapons not in use by the watch should be kept under cover to keep them from being fouled or damaged by enemy fire. It is most imperative that all weapons be cleaned daily, and if the outpost tour is a long one they should be test-fired.

Ammunition and grenades should be placed in machine gun cans under cover and made readily accessible. Daily police of the cramped area must be maintained or living conditions will become unbearable.

One Marine should be designated as the supply chief, responsible for handling and storing the incredibly large amount of gear needed to support such an advanced position. The problem of storage often becomes acute, and to alleviate it mortar-proof storage bunkers should be built as well as protective shelters for the men.

In addition to the supply chief, another Marine should be assigned to supervise the Koreans and Marines involved in digging and improving defenses. A program of definite improvement must be maintained even though enemy threats against the position may seem to have subsided. Due to the lack of exercise and fresh air, and the cramped living space, men on combat outpost duty can easily become lethargic and slack in their efforts. Work on projects designed to improve the position is the best medicine for this condition.

Prior to setting in at night, the lieutenant, his FO and the platoon sergeant should have accurate information from the MLR on friendly

movements in the vicinity. The word should be relayed to the entire platoon on all information received, and all troops should know what plans have been made for support from higher units. A definite scheme of defense for the outpost should be made up and rehearsed (if possible) so that in the confusion of a night assault or barrage each individual will know where to go and what to do.

☛ THE STANDARD watch should be a 50-percent proposition. The men on the off-watch should have their weapons and ammunition with them and should be located near the position they are to man. Particularly exposed positions and listening post assignments should be rotated each night. Sound power telephones and "rabbit's ears" should be utilized to the utmost. From the outpost command bunker, the platoon sergeant and the commander should alternate in making inspection tours and standing by the radio netted-in with the MLR.

Pre-arranged pyrotechnic signals should be planned for use in the event of radio or telephone failure during enemy attacks at night. Also, at night, troops should be instructed to use grenades rather than small-arms fire to repel small groups of enemy probers seeking to locate Marine positions. The grenade is the best weapon for defense of a hill and at least 20 grenades per man should be on hand if a night-long defense is contemplated. As far as illuminating grenades are concerned—they are a mixed blessing. Frequently they light up friendly bunkers and parapets better than they do the enemy coming up the slope.

Grenades of the white phosphorus type can be used to designate targets for the supporting fires but they also tend to shield the attacking force. Searchlights on the MLR can furnish the best illumination if they are employed correctly. In many cases they have prevented the Chinese from surprising and over-running the outpost with their first rush.

Above all, BARs, carbines, grease guns, captured burp guns and machine guns should be given preference as outpost weapons over the M-1 rifle. This heresy will shock veterans of the earlier Korean fight-

ing, but the situation is a different one. Outpost warfare is night war where long-range rifle fire is impossible and useless. The need is for a large volume of fire at 50 to 100 yards and only automatic weapons and hand grenades will do the job.

Harassing fire can be delivered by 3.5-inch rocket launchers and snipers armed with BARs and rifles. However, thanks to UN air and artillery fire superiority in the past, the Chinese usually kept their heads down during the day. This situation may not remain the same if the action resumes so it might be well to consider the necessity for daylight H&I fire.

There are other considerations for the defense. Flamethrowers, for instance, may be placed to cover trenches leading into the outpost. Barbed wire, reinforced by napalm fougasses can be laid under cover of darkness to hamper enemy movements. It should be borne in mind, however, that any pre-assault bombardment will tear large gaps in such wire, and the Chinese also have wire cutters, bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges. As a final word, mines and booby traps should be placed with care and carefully marked since friendly patrols, supply trains and casualty-evacuation parties are liable to blunder into them.

Now for the attack itself. We found that Chinese night attacks varied greatly. The foe was usually content to suffer his daily beating by Marine artillery, aircraft and raiding parties without retaliation for several weeks, hoping to lull the garrison into a false sense of security.

But he was not idle. He was digging his way industriously toward the outpost, constructing approach trenches and bunkers in which to place supporting machine guns and rocket launchers. Then on the chosen night he would mass several companies and attempt to rush and overwhelm the position before the Marines could man their trenches. Usually this rush was preceded by heavy mortar and artillery fire that often began as much as a day before the attack and at times reached a concentration of over a thousand rounds an hour on one small area.

The enemy assault force came equipped with grenades, burp guns, satchel charges and machine guns.

As stated before, every effort was made to isolate the outpost by artillery and mortar fire before the attack, and in addition strong groups of infantry would filter beyond the outpost to hold blocking positions between the outpost and the MLR.

Surrounded, hit by stunning artillery and mortar concentrations, then assaulted by overwhelming numbers, it would seem that our troops would have had little chance of survival. Such was not the case. In most instances all but the most determined enemy efforts were dealt with by a combination of fire from the combat outpost's own weapons and pre-arranged "box" barrages called down by the FO. In cases where the enemy penetrated the fire and partially occupied the hill, our troops would retire to the deepest bunkers and as a last resort would call down VT fused artillery on the position.

☛ A MEASURE of this type involved considerable risk of causing casualties from friendly fire and of being wiped out in bunkers by grenades and satchel charges, but the VT wreaked havoc among the unprotected Chinese milling around on top of the open hill.

Attacking up a steep slope at night against an alert and enthusiastic defense and through a curtain of artillery and mortar fire is no picnic. Spotted in time, most attacks can be routed before they get started. If the outpost officer is fully prepared with a minimum watch maintained through the preliminary barrage even at the risk of taking casualties, once the curtain of fire lifts and the enemy come screaming up the slope there is usually little doubt as to the outcome. It resolves itself into the odorous and routine job of collecting and disposing of the enemy dead and wounded the next morning.

Marines in Korea learned through surviving these attacks that an outpost can be incredibly battered, smashed and even over-run, but that imagination, discipline and spirit still counted in holding against fantastic odds.

Static warfare was a different type of warfare for Marines but they met its problems as they met other problems before, and they managed to impose their will on a formidable and resourceful enemy. USMC



Cook's Tour for Pilots

✦ IN KOREA MARINE AVIATION operated around the clock day in and day out. There was no such thing as two up and one back for the flyers, no going into reserve, no rear-area training unit.

Yet the replacements flowed in each month and there was the continuing problem of getting the new men battle-wise while still meeting daily commitments for operations against the enemy.

Since the peculiarities of air war are not constant and vary with each campaign, even veteran pilots with battle-starred theater ribbons undergo an immersion shock on their first flight against a new enemy.

By Maj Thomas J. Saxon

But, just as Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, "... there are certain things to be learned from battle experience that can be absorbed in no other way."

Recognizing this premise, Marine Attack Squadron 323 of Marine Air Group 12 initiated its "Battle Training Program" for replacement pilots coming to Korea in April 1952. This combat refresher was designed to polish up the bombing, rocket-firing and strafing ability of each pilot joining the "Deathrattler" squadron. It was a shot in the arm for all pilots coming to Korea whether they were battle-starred veterans, recently recalled reserves or fledglings from flight school.

Such training was not a new thing. All squadrons had regular training programs for pilots, but ours was unique in one respect—all phases of the shooting part of the curriculum were carried out over enemy territory with the pilots attacking actual targets.

When a pilot reported in to the squadron for duty he had two thorough indoctrination sessions behind him. Both covered such subjects as aerial map reading, air-sea rescue, ordnance, aerology, cold

weather operations and survival, navigational aids and general discussion of Marine air operations in Korea. The first session given at MCAS, El Toro prior to shipment overseas was general in scope; while the second, conducted at MAG-12, was more detailed and specific.

Reporting in to VMA-323 after these two indoctrination sessions, the replacement was usually eager to go after the handshaking, introduction to the mess and general pleasantries were over. It was understandable that he groaned when he saw himself scheduled for another two days of lectures.

But the grippers were silenced and the silent sufferers opened up after the first session. The "lectures" proved to be practical work periods and seminars where a Korea-experienced pilot took one or two replacements in tow and assisted them in getting orientated on the dozens of aerial maps so necessary to pilots who operated in the Korean theater.

A ground check-out of the squadron's planes, an ordnance check-out and the drawing of additional survival gear followed. Then the pilot was ready for his first flight in Korea. Normally this was a familiarization

hop in the general vicinity of the field to allow the flier to get the feel of the aircraft again and to look over the area.

Now he was ready for his first "training mission."

The training mission was actually a strike on an enemy target in the southern part of the Haeju peninsula. The squadron's most experienced pilot usually led the strike, and model targets such as road intersections, buildings suspected of containing supplies, railroads, enemy gun emplacements and trenches were selected to give the new man a variety of targets on his first shoot.

The primary consideration in the selection of the target area was to pick out an area that kept the pilots over enemy territory the minimum amount of time. Usually sufficient targets were available near the seacoast to permit pilots to start their attack over the Yellow Sea, drop their loads and recover out to sea all in a period of two or three minutes. As the waters in this area were patrolled by friendly ships, there was little chance of losing a pilot on this first mission.

Since this was an actual mission, the radio voice procedures employed

A veteran took the new pilots under his wing



in Korea were used. Previously, of course, these voice procedures had been covered in ground briefings that were part of the indoctrinary lectures. After the attacks were completed, the strike leader took his brood of replacements on a familiarization flight behind battle lines to point out prominent landmarks. On the way back, emergency landing fields were spotted for them.

Two or three such "training-under-fire" missions gave replacement pilots experience in hitting practically every type of target normally attacked, without encouraging the heavy concentrations of flak that guarded such targets in North Korea. In addition, it gave the pilots additional experience and practice in firing or dropping the various types of ordnance used by the squadron.

But most important, these training-under-fire missions kept the enemy transportation net and fortifications, which had been dug in along the southern coast of the Haeju peninsula, knocked out and of little use to the enemy. We were accomplishing our training and some of our combat missions at the same time.

Success of the indoctrination was apparent immediately. The "first Korean mission" qualms were squelched and the accuracy of the pilots' bombing on their first few missions improved remarkably. Other squadrons soon followed in adopting similar "model strike" programs.

To further expand the pilot indoctrination program on a group level, Marine and Army ground officers and pilots flying other types of aircraft in Korea were invited to the field to talk about their particular operations.

Another step taken to equip Marine pilots with as much skill and knowledge as possible was instituted a few weeks later by BrigGen Clayton C. Jerome, who was commanding general of the 1st Marine Air Wing. He formulated the "Cook's Tour."

The Cook's Tour was designed to increase the over-all efficiency of close air support, particularly in front of the 1st Marine Division sector of the front.

Pilots from all fighter-bomber squadrons in the wing spent a two-

day orientation period with the Marine observation squadron operating near the front with the division.

First, pilots received a briefing from the VMO intelligence officer. This was followed by a "wrap-up" given by one of the division's G-2 officers. Next, pilots took a close, bird's-eye view of the rugged terrain in front of the division from the back seat of a slow, low-flying observation plane. On the next flight, also in an OE, the "visiting firemen" watched the VMO pilot direct a close air support mission on a reverse slope. This trip enabled the pilot to see a second side of the picture.

A TRIP to the front lines by helicopter was next. Primarily this trip was designed to permit the pilots to observe an air strike from the forward air controller's position, thereby giving them the valuable ground-control viewpoint. But the visit usually accomplished much more.

It allowed the pilots a close look at the infantrymen—the footsloggers they were supporting. They saw the bunkers and the trenches, they felt the heat or cold and they viewed the effects of the rain or snow. They saw what a morale booster a close air strike was to the Marine on the ground and were made to feel they were more a part of the team.

On occasion during the pilot's visit to the lines, "Luke" would range in his mortars or artillery. Being pinned down by fire or crouching in a bunker while enemy mortars bounced off the top of the shelter would always give the pilot a personal interest in making his next strike as accurate as possible.

During this portion of the visit the pilots were given an opportunity to talk with contemporaries in the division about close air support. A final discussion with VMO pilots wound up the tour, and the fighter-bomber pilots went back to their bases. They knew the division sector like the palms of their hands.

Again, results were immediately apparent. Pilots who were called in for close air support strikes in front of the division didn't need detailed, time-consuming fire dictions from the FAC or the TAC to find their targets. Usually, as soon as the target coordinates and descriptions were relayed, the pilot radioed, "I know


that hunk of real estate. I've had the Cook's Tour."

And the Marine on the ground waiting for the strike had more confidence in the pilot. The plane wasn't an inanimate thing any more because the men who flew the planes had been on the firing lines and the footslogger had seen them there. The infantryman knew that to these pilots the "line" wasn't just a grease-pencil tracing on an overlay—it was a vital ribbon composed of Marines like themselves and friendly troops on one side, and the enemy on the other.

Of course the Cook's Tour plan would not be practical in a campaign of movement such as the Marine Corps normally follows. But in the static phase of the Korean action it provided a path towards a faster and more effective close air support.

These are only two of the many training and indoctrination techniques that were developed in Korea by Marine aviation units. They illustrate, however, that the Corps is still following in the footsteps of other Marine generations in producing the "forged-under-fire" methods which insure the payoff of battles being credited to our account—not the enemy's.

US MC



TWO MAKE

Two men working together can make an effective
combat unit. Let's tell them how to do it



E A TEAM

By LtCol Brooke Nihart

❖ A RECENT SONG HIT INFORMS US that "It takes two to tango." As a point of logic this observation approaches redundancy. Just as redundant, it may seem to you, is the idea that it takes at least two individuals to make a tactical team or that a minimum of two can be tactically effective.

Yet, while two-man teams are commonplace in sports, and Marine aviation's mutually supporting two-plane element is the essence of air-to-air tactics, there exists a gap in infantry tactics and technique between the conduct of the individual and the tactics of the fireteam.

Two individuals co-operating in combat make a pair—a team—whose total combat power is greater than the sum of its parts. (The parts being the two men acting as individuals rather than as a team.) In fact, two-man team tactics may be likened to the strategy of a boxer—a good one will always fight with both hands, leading or advancing with one while the other is ready at all time to block an opponent's blow, or strike if an opening presents itself.

Individuals have, on occasion, performed outstanding feats in combat,

but this is the exception rather than the rule. To depend on any one man rising to great heights in a critical situation is a dangerous and unsound premise. The average man needs close comradeship and psychological bolstering to meet the mental strain of the battlefield. These needs are given by special training (which creates self-confidence and confidence in one's fellows), by instilling esprit de corps, by good leadership and by unit teamwork right down to the four-man fireteam. The effect

of a properly trained team, it is repeated, is greater than the sum of its parts.

But not all men are in fireteams. At times men must operate in groups smaller than the fireteam, and sometimes fireteams are depleted. What then? Without the fireteam—our smallest tactical unit—what do we have? Granted, we should have men whose actions are governed by Marine Corps-wide training that has prepared them for these eventualities. I'm afraid, however, that this





Two-man combat . . . not in the manual

is not the case. Why not? Simply because the rules of combat tactics for a two-man team have neither been set down in our manuals, nor has emphasis been universally placed on them in our training programs.

Fireteam organization and tactics are prescribed in the *Marine Rifle Squad*. Conduct of the individual is well covered in FM 21-75, *Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling*. Combat principles, including individual, fireteam, squad, platoon and company, are covered in *The Landing Party Manual*. A perusal of these books tells you that it takes four men and a Browning automatic rifle to make a fireteam. When one man is hit, the three men left can still carry on as a fireteam. The tactics prescribed are simple, clear and basic in the Marine Corps.

❁ BUT HOW DOES the fireteam operate when it is reduced to two men or when it is split into halves by accident or design? How can the team of sniper and observer, or the team of BARman and assistant, operate most effectively? What are the techniques of double sentries and double messengers that make these methods more reliable than their single counterparts? Why are two-man foxholes better than individual foxholes, and how do the two men who carry out the two-man jobs work together?

Psychological aspects of the two-man team have been recognized in the past by the so-called "buddy system," which was successfully utilized by the Commandos, Raiders, Rangers and paratroop units. Two men lived, worked, trained and fought together. Their co-operative action in combat must have been almost automatic because of their familiarity with each other's reactions and



Co-operation must be automatic

signals. Yet, most of the training in two-man techniques for these units was limited to the "two-man foxhole" and "double sentry" school, with the co-operative action more an outgrowth of familiarity than a result of the training.

The two-man team applies the individual techniques of weapons use and scouting, and adds the keystone concept of minor tactics—fire and movement. This increases the material and psychological effects of the two men's weapons, since one element is covering the other by fire or is in position to fire while the other element is moving to close the range on the enemy. As the second element takes up a new position, the original covering element moves up in turn, with this leapfrog action being repeated until the objective is gained. This movement can be used in reverse if a withdrawal is indicated.

We stress here the idea of movement even with two men. Without movement nothing is accomplished.


If forward movement is possible in the attack, not to move is to neglect one's duty. If forward movement is not possible, enemy fire superiority is implied and local disengagement indicated. To stand fast under enemy fire superiority means eventual total casualties. Immobility spells stagnation and loss of initiative.

Though this explanation may seem superfluous to some, it is necessary. On many occasions I have seen two men in situations calling for effective two-man movements act as if there never was or ever could be any such thing. Two-man techniques must be prescribed and taught. They do not just happen.

Let us take a look at these two-man team techniques.

Take first the basic technique, two men in fire and movement. They may be the remnants of a fireteam carrying on its mission, the lead half of a fireteam on a mountain trail or jungle path, half a fireteam separated from the rest by the small nose of a hill or by intervening woods or other obstacles, or just two men separated from their units and thrown together on the battlefield and faced with a situation calling for tactical action.

Under conditions where incon-



More than two in each

spicuous movement is desirable, such as two scouts moving ahead of a squad or patrol, the lead man creeps, crawls or stealthily moves at a crouch from bush to bush or rock to rock without any rapid eye-catching motions. His rear man is in firing position, his rifle loaded, unlocked and sighted-in on possible targets. (A two-man reconnaissance patrol would operate in the same way.)


If speed and aggressiveness are in order to permit a more rapid advance of units in the rear, the movement is also accomplished by short, quick bounds with one man always ready to lay down covering fire. The emphasis on the scouting team, of course, is to see without being seen and to find the enemy rather than close with him.

Actions of the BAR team are similar in many respects to two-man fire and movement, since the BARman and his assistant alternately cover each other's moves. This is not the only thing to be learned by the team, though. The assistant BARman must practice changing magazines both in the prone position and when on the move until the action is automatic and can be done in the dark. Proficiency results in a greater rate of sustained fire and helps to prevent loss of valuable magazines, as may be the case when the BARman himself attempts to change magazines rapidly.

The assistant must also be ready to increase his rate of fire to protect the BARman when the latter is clearing a stoppage, and should be prepared, if the BARman is hit, to take over not only the automatic rifle but also the belt with its am-



One to spot, one to shoot



Doubled up for security

nade assault. The BARman or rifleman lays down covering fire to protect his teammate who is rising to throw the grenade. Fire is resumed when the grenade lands, thus discouraging the enemy from throwing it back.

Two-man teams can also be utilized to advantage in sniping. An observer-sniper combination is much more effective than a single sniper acting independently or, for that matter, two riflemen. It also eliminates the absolute necessity for using a telescopic sight, since the observer using binoculars or a telescope can locate the targets or adjust fire.

The two men can move into a suitable firing position by the fire and movement technique previously described. Once in an advantageous location, the mission becomes one of target location and designation, range estimation, shooting skill and adjustment of fire. The use of scouting and patrolling techniques and an eye for terrain and tactical prudence will get a team many kills

without the men endangering themselves. Were all riflemen to understand and practice this technique, it would go far toward realizing the potential of aimed rifle fire seldom even approached in combat.

On flank security missions for a patrol or column, two men will have more than double the effectiveness of a single individual. One man can place himself on the inside where he can keep the patrol leader or column in sight, while the other, acting as flanker, can move up to 25 yards farther out and still remain within easy sight, sound and close support range of the inside man. Yet the flanker is able to investigate the other side of the ridge or inside the edge of the woods. Beyond this, the men act the same as two-man teams in fire and movement or scouting.

When fighting in built-up areas, a fireteam should be split into two-man teams before the room-to-room search of a building begins. The two men of a team can cover each other, while more than two will just get in each other's way.

Entry into a room should be preceded by a grenade with the first man of the team following its explosion to exploit the grenade's shock effect. After his own entry, the first man puts his back to the nearest wall to cover the entry and search by his teammate.

Now, let us go back into the open again and on to connecting files which are used to maintain contact between elements in a column or between other separated elements. The connecting files are a visible link between the elements and can pass signals and messages back and forth. Two-man versions of this technique are best since they can keep contact



in each other's way

munition and essential spare parts. In addition, the two men should have a signal for use when the BAR magazine is empty, so that both BAR and M-1 rifle are not empty at the same time.

Another of the fire and movement techniques usable by both rifle and BAR teams in the final stages of an assault and in mopping-up operations is the two-man bullet and gre-

around bends in a trail or over hill-tops where one man would not be able to do the job.

The two men in a connecting file keep each other in sight even though they may be as much as 100 yards apart. One keeps the front unit in sight while the other maintains view of the unit in the rear, with both reporting to their parent outfit if contact cannot be kept. The two men halt on orders from the rear or when the unit ahead of them stops, they make certain that the unit to the rear follows the correct route and they pass on all orders, signals or messages in either direction.

Most readers are familiar with the two-man foxhole, which goes far toward doing away with the psychological disadvantage of feeling alone in combat. The usual 50 percent alert at night and the penchant of the Chinese and North Koreans, as shown in the Korean war, for night attacks and infiltration, have demonstrated again the need for this technique.

During preparation of the position one man covers and observes while the other digs. In defense, one stands watch while the other sleeps, goes for rations or ammunition or otherwise attends to necessary tasks. When under attack, one can fire while the other reloads. Or one man can cover the area to the front while the other fires to the flank, thus supporting adjacent positions.

When a squad is organizing for defense, the two-man system can also be used to advantage. Two men may be set up as an outpost not more than 100-200 yards ahead of the squad. They move to and from their post by use of the two-man scouting team methods and take positions covering the important approach into the squad position, naturally choosing a spot where they can get maximum observation.

One man can observe at a distance while the other watches the sector close by, or both may cover sectors at close range. A two-man listening post performs a similar mission at night, though usually it is set up much closer to the parent unit on a likely enemy avenue of approach. If approached by enemy forces, it quietly withdraws by a predetermined route and gives the alarm or challenges or fires on the unfriendly units before withdrawing.

Two plus, for confidence

The two who man the observation post move to their vantage point in the same manner as for setting up an outpost, if the OP is forward of the main line of resistance. Once in position, the team adopts a definite plan for searching the sector assigned for observation. One man scans with the naked eye or binoculars while the other watches at close range for local security, records the other's observations and reports by phone or radio. The men should switch duties at frequent intervals because of the eye fatigue resultant from long-range observation.

One of the two-man techniques successfully utilized for some time is the double sentry, which is much safer and more efficient than the single sentry set-up. It is a simple matter for a well-trained infiltrator to assault a single sentry in an exposed position, but it is quite another matter to successfully take out two men without the alarm being given.

✦ ON A WALKING POST, double sentries should keep in close sight contact, but they should not remain so close that both can be hit by a single burst of fire. Each man should constantly cover the other. For example, when one sentry challenges, the other sentry should immediately take cover and concealment and cover the challenging sentry with his weapon. Similarly, on a fixed post where challenging is in order, such as a listening post, roadblock, MLR or outpost position or rear-area security post, one man should cover the challenger, preferably from a concealed flank position out of line of attention and fire between the challenging sentry and the person being challenged. In that way, if the individual and his party should prove unfriendly, they are immediately covered from an unexpected direction.

Still another two-man technique used when the mission is particularly difficult or dangerous is the double-messenger system. Each man will carry a copy of the message. The two will remain in sight of each other, separated just enough so that they cannot both be ambushed or ex-



posed to the same fire at once. Of course, should either be attacked, the other would cover him with fire to aid his escape or disengagement.

A final two-man system which was not mentioned until last because of its complete coverage in FM 23-25 is the bayonet team. Suffice to say that the tactic in essence is to flank an enemy group, split it up and concentrate two-on-one from different directions. All depends upon speed in execution and an instinctive knowledge of what to do and what your teammate will do. This, in fact, is the entire two-man team concept and objective in action.

Undoubtedly, there are other two-man techniques which have not been covered here which are both psychologically and tactically sound and necessary. Recognition of the present techniques and evolution of new ones will help to put our small units on a firmer basis. By putting the two-man concepts into practice in our training, rather than leaving them as vague and imperfectly understood techniques, we will establish tactical doctrine to replace the present fragmentary knowledge. Just as it takes two to tango, it also takes two to make a team.

US & MC

KOREA AWARDS



Medal of Honor

Cpl Alford L. McLaughlin, 2dLt George H. O'Brien, Jr., Pfc Robert E. Simanek.

Navy Cross

1stLt Arthur R. Bancroft, TSgt Edwin L. Knox, Sgt Perry A. Mallette, Sgt Howard Ryan, 2dLt Earl L. Valentine, Jr., 2dLt John G. Word.

Silver Star

Cpl Edward J. Borowski, Jr., Cpl Edward J. Boyd, Pfc Joseph P. Bundrick, Maj Joseph S. Buntin (2d), Pfc Herbert J. Casey, 1stLt William G. Curran, Jr., Pfc Robert S. Durham, Pfc Theodore Eastman, Pfc Herbert R. Eaton, 2dLt Thomas W. Evans, Cpl Alexander P. Goff, Jr., Cpl William D. Good, SSgt Joseph S. Kassebaum, Capt Edward N. Le Faivre (3d), Cpl Carval Legursky, 2dLt Robert J. Leister, Sgt August P. Longo, Jr., SSgt Thomas F. Lyons.

Pfc Malcolm A. Mac Askill, Capt Charles L. Mullins, Pfc Warren L. Munson, 2dLt Louis M. Pelosi, Pfc Charles A. Phillips, 2dLt Robert D. Purcell, Pfc Roscoe J. Sciuti, 1stLt James G. Severns, Cpl Clyde E. Smith, Sgt Russel J. Smith, Pfc George Speedy, SSgt Robert S. Steigerwald, Cpl Marvin F. Thomas, Cpl Earnest H. Upmeyer, Sgt Claude W. Weaver, Pfc William W. Weitzel, SSgt Billie W. Windsor, 1stLt Russell D. L. Wirth, Jr.

Legion of Merit

Col Henry W. Buse, Jr., Maj John H. Faggart, LtCol Alexander W. Gentleman (2d), LtCol Robert D. Heintz, Jr., LtCol Homer G. Hutchinson, LtCol Olin W. Jones, LtCol Floyd M. Johnson, Jr., LtCol Richard S. Johnson, Col. Sidney M. Kelly, LtCol Arthur C. Lowell, LtCol Robert B. McBroom, LtCol Marshall R. Pilcher, Col Louis B. Robertshaw.

Distinguished Flying Cross

LtCol Arthur H. Adams (4th), Capt Robert V. Anderson, Maj Ronald L. Bruce (2d), Maj Robert H. Buettner (3d), Maj Elton H. Clark, Maj David Cleeland (2d), Capt George S. Cripps, Capt Robert L. Gibson (2d), Capt Lewis W. Gillis, 1stLt William J. Goodsell, LtCol Roy R. Hewitt, Capt Harvey L. Jensen (3d), Maj Robert M. Keim (3d), Capt Russell W. Kuehl, Maj John H. La Voy, 1stLt Richard Lyons, Capt William C. McGraw, Jr., 2dLt Burton W. Randall, Maj Glenn L. Rieder

(3d), Capt Mervyn T. Schuerman (2d), Capt Bradford N. Slenning (2d), Maj Harry A. Stahlstrom, Capt Roy M. Taylor, Capt Charles M. Wallace, Jr., Capt Gerald M. Ware, 2dLt Ivan L. Watts.

Navy and Marine Corps Medal

Cpl Peter G. Esposito, SSgt Nicholas F. Krajacic, Sgt Edgar S. Roberts, Jr.

Bronze Star

Maj James A. Apfel, Jr., Capt David E. Archer, Pfc Charles D. Arnold, Capt Layton S. Ausen, Sgt Herbert Awkland, Jr., LtCol Arthur J. Bachuber, Capt Stewart C. Barber, Maj Frederick W. Barnes, Maj Harold Bartlett, Cpl Charles R. Batherson, LtCol Roy J. Batterton, 1stLt David B. Borie, 1stLt William A. Bowden, Jr., 1stLt Albert R. Bowman, II, Maj Robert E. Brant (2d), MSgt Wilson E. Brogdon, SSgt Russell Bumpass, Cpl Donald R. Bullion, 2dLt Francis M. Burleigh, Jr., Maj Warren A. Butcher.

Pfc Cassie Butler, Pfc Anthony Calardo, 1stLt Robert D. Campbell, LtCol Anthony Caputo, 1stLt William L. Carroll, Pfc Robert J. Carpenter, SSgt Homer W. Cates, Jr., Capt Denver D. Clark, Sgt Robert A. Connly, Jr., Pfc Stanley W. Crowley, Maj Edward F. Danowitz, LtCol Bert Davis, Pfc Rodger A. De Jonge, Maj William C. Doty, Jr., Cpl Anthony P. Douglas, 2dLt Franklin P. Dunbaugh, TSgt Francis Ehrenreich, Pfc John Ellingburg, Pfc Augustus Elliott.

Capt Robert M. Erbland, MSgt William E. Fales, Capt Robert C. Fike, Sgt James E. Fisher, 2dLt Edward T. Fogo, 1stLt Milton V. Freeman, 2dLt Roy H. French, 2dLt Roger E. Galliher, MSgt James F. Galloway, Sgt Richard D. Gaskins, Sgt John A. Geddes, Col Joseph A. Gerath, Jr., Pfc Herman Gonzalez, SSgt Robert L. Gutierrez, TSgt Daniel C. Georgia, Capt Gerald W. Gibson, Pfc Hilliard N. Goldorf, Pfc Melvin E. Goldsmith, Capt Carl R. Gray, 2dLt MacDonald Greer, Cpl Roy L. Griffin, Capt Goodwin C. Groff, Sgt Eugene G. Gunderson, SSgt William H. Gunter.

2dLt Robert G. Haggard, Pfc Ronald J. Hamilton, Sgt Richard J. Handing, Maj Patrick Harrison, SSgt Elton L. Hart, Pfc Richard K. Hawthorne, SSgt Stacy J. Henderson, 2dLt Emil W. Herich, Sgt James R. Heshion, 2dLt John Hewitt, Pfc Warren R. Hibben, Pfc Ben A. Hickman, Pfc James M. Hill, Cpl Leroy R. Hints, Sgt Cecil W. Hobbs, Cpl William E. Hodges, Pfc Albert A. Hughes, Pfc Raymond Hutto, Cpl Kenneth J. Jack, SSgt Antonio Jaime,

Cpl Ralph James, Maj Everette T. Jenkins, TSgt Lorin C. Johns.

Sgt Silver M. Jones, Pfc James E. Jones, Capt Clark V. Judge, 1stLt William J. Keating, Maj George E. Kelly, Sgt Robert F. Kelly, Cpl Phillip D. Kerz, 1stLt Calhoun J. Killeen, LtCol Edwin C. Kimball, Sgt Marion R. King, Cpl William B. King, SSgt Marion G. Kinkade, Sgt Albertus T. Kleintop, Jr., Sgt Stanley A. Klesta.

Pfc Edward N. Kosakowski, MSgt Joseph P. Kratoski (2d), Cpl Earl V. C. Krone, Capt Harold R. Kurth, Jr., Cpl Ronald F. Lambert, SSgt Morton S. Landy, Capt Robert J. Larsen, Pfc Alvin J. Lastovka, 2dLt Robert E. Lee, Cpl William H. Leigh, TSgt Kenneth L. Leone, Pfc Louis W. Leonhardt, SSgt William S. Life, Pfc Jose M. Linares-Ortiz, 1stLt Robert L. Lockhart, Sgt George A. Lockwood, Pfc Earl Lofthouse, Pfc Glen R. Luckey, LtCol John B. Maas, Jr., Pfc Robert T. Maguire, LtCol Thomas "H" Mann, Jr., Cpl Martin Marcus, Maj Rolland E. Marker, TSgt John R. Matheson, 2dLt Raymond F. McCloskey, Cpl James F. McCorkle, Pfc Franklin D. McCoy, Sgt Donald R. McDaniel, Cpl William S. McRee, Capt Theodore J. Mildner, Pfc James R. Millard (2d), SSgt Kenneth E. Miller, Cpl Raymond M. Miller, SSgt Clifford D. Mooney, Capt Paul B. Montague, Cpl Clifton R. Morris, Pfc John E. Newton, 1stLt Robert J. Norton, LtCol Robert J. Oddy, WO Edward D. Phifer.

2dLt Earl A. Pike (2d), 1stLt Brooke F. Read, Cpl Donald W. Reeser, 2dLt James R. A. Rehfs, Maj Horace C. Reifel, Sgt John C. Sherwood, Maj Melvin L. Sibulkin, 2dLt Emmett B. Sigmon, Capt Wilber F. Taylor, Maj Stanley Tesko, LtCol George B. Thomas, Sgt John Vance, Sgt Harold E. Wadely, LtCol Howard L. Walter (2d), Sgt Herbert D. Wilson, Pfc William C. Wood, Pfc Grant L. Yenerall, 2dLt Gary L. Yundt, Maj William J. Zaro, Capt Robert Zeugner.



in brief

Nuclear-powered aircraft for the future are up for study. The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation has accepted a contract from the Air Force to conduct a preliminary design search on atom-driven planes.

The deadliest weapon in the world, the U.S. Marine and his rifle, should become even more inseparable in the near future. Under a new general order the individual Marine will turn in his rifle only when he must transfer from one post to another by a public conveyance or privately owned vehicle. When travelling with troop units, or if it is necessary for the preservation of combat readiness, the Marine will carry his rifle with him.



Eighty-four-year-old retired bandman Arthur DeMarco (above) shows his 1896 helmet to two present members of the Marine Band. DeMarco, who was a French horn player and violinist, retired in 1926.




It was natural that the Army's new wrist radio (above) should be dubbed the "Dick Tracy." The two and five-eighths ounce radio operates on a tuning range of from 1,000 to 1,500 kilocycles and has a range of approximately 40 miles.

Christmas parcels for members of the Armed Forces overseas must be mailed before 15 November, if they are to reach the recipient by Christmas day. Packages should not exceed 70 pounds in weight or 100 inches in length and girth combined. In addition to the usual articles normally prohibited in the mails, matches of all kinds and lighter fluids are banned from all parcels.

Annual NROTC examinations are scheduled for December 12th. Applications for examination are available to high school seniors or graduates between the ages of 17 and 21. The applications may be obtained at Navy recruiting stations throughout the country. About 2,000 students are expected to enroll.

An artist's conception of the new XHR2S transport helicopter being built for the Marines by the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation is shown at the left. The new 'copter was described by the Commandant as "a real helicopter troop transport" capable of carrying two combat assault squads — about 26 men.





The keel for the Navy's second atom-powered submarine has been laid at the Groton, Conn., yard of the Electric Boat Co. To be christened *Sea Wolf*, the new sub will be of the same general design as the *Nautilus*, the Navy's first atom sub, but the power plant will be different. Power for the *Sea Wolf* will derive from an intermediate neutron energy reactor and a liquid metal coolant.

The Navy's construction cost for the *Nautilus* was estimated at 29 million dollars. The *Sea Wolf* is expected to cost over 32 million.



The close relationship between the British Royal Marines and the U. S. Marine Corps will soon be cemented further by an exchange of officer students. At the request of the British government a Marine officer will be sent to England to enter a series of Royal Marine courses which will include amphibious and commando training.

At Camp Perry, Ohio, the Marines walked away with almost every trophy in sight during the annual National Rifle Matches. Shown (left) being congratulated by LtCol G. T. Fowler is MSgt Maxim R. Beebe who won the Navy Cup Match and the Service Rifle National Championship. Other "deadeyes" were MSgt Harold E. Taylor, National Individual Champion; LtCol Walter R. Walsh, winner of the Scott Trophy and the Members Trophy Match; TSgt J. A. Zahm who won the President's Cup; 1stLt R. E. De La Hunt who copped the Old Timers' Match; Crowell Trophy Match winner, Sgt R. L. Arnaud; and LtCol E. O. Swanson who took both the International Aggregate and the Free Rifle Match. SSgt D. L. Smith took the NRA Match Rifle National Championship and 2dLt S. G. Mil- lar took the Rapid Fire Aggregate. In team matches the Marine Corps took four of the first five places.



Carrier landings will be a lot safer in the future, thanks to a new automatic device that "clocks" a plane approaching a carrier deck. Installed on the flight deck, it "watches" the approach of a plane coming in for a landing and warns the landing signal officer if the plane's speed is too fast or too slow. The artist's sketch (above) shows how radar waves are kept trained on the plane as it approaches the flight deck. The "echoes," rebounding off the plane and picked up again by the antenna, are computed by a speed indicator to show the plane's true air speed, which is relayed to the dial at the feet of the landing signal officer.



To keep a hot charge in portable radio batteries the Army Signal Corps is experimenting with the new flexible vest shown above. Made with 117 pockets to hold dry cells, the vest has been designed to be worn under the overcoat. Dry cells kept warm in this fashion have many times as much energy as batteries that are exposed to freezing cold.

An eight-ton electronic computer capable of performing a multiplication or division in 15 thousandths of a second has been installed in the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics at Washington.



A new Marine jet fighter (above) is ready to go into production. It is the North American FJ-2 Fury, and from all reports it can hold its own with the Air Force's Sabre Jet in speed and performance.


SAVE WITH...



SUB-CALIBER


Make gun-drill alive, give them 'flash and bang'

... at bargain prices




☛ YOU HAVE TO DRIVE 'EM TO KEEP 'em going on the snapping-in range, but once the actual firing starts, keen interest replaces boredom. The click of a bolt going home on an empty chamber is a poor substitute for the crack produced by the firing pin striking a 53-grain cartridge and the buck of the piece as the projectile leaves the muzzle.

It's natural that snapping-in should be considered a dull, even though necessary, routine. And by the same token, with crew-served weapons hours of gun drill become monotonous to the crew. But give them live rounds to fire in their weapons and they're sharp as a tack—alive to the training and ready to go.



By Capt Perry T. Brixey



Thus it is obvious that if we could permit our gun crews to practice with live ammo every day, they would be more efficient and better trained with the weapon they use in combat. It's also obvious that permitting all gun crews to fire regularly would run up the tax assessment for each citizen.

However, there is an answer to the cost problem, a method by which the gun crews can have their "flash" and "bang," and we can all breathe easier come March 15th. The answer lies in the extensive use of sub-caliber firing devices.

Most of us are familiar with sub-caliber firing devices and the functions performed by them. Briefly, they are designed to permit crews to fire and train with larger caliber weapons while economizing on ammunition costs. For instance, one such device designed to train "four-deuce" mortar crews uses a substitute tube within the 4.2 designed to fire 60mm ammunition. Another in use, one with which I am particularly concerned, was built for 75mm recoilless weapons. It consists of a carbine barrel fitted into a 75mm recoilless shell and rigged to fire a round of carbine ammunition when the trigger is squeezed on the 75mm.

Figure the cost of a 4.2 round against the cost of a round of 60mm, or the cost of a round of 75mm recoilless against the cost of a round of carbine ammo and you can realize the savings effected. Yet, the crews have the conditions needed to stimulate interest as they go through the same process they would use with



regular ammunition. The only real difference noted in firing the lighter caliber ammunition is in the intensity of the explosion produced and the shortened range of the projectile—also an advantage when space is at a premium.

On the basis of my experience with sub-caliber devices for the 75mm gun in both the States and in Korea, I am firmly convinced that they should play a more important part in the training of gunners.

My first contact with these devices came at Camp Pendleton while I was attached to a regimental instruction staff. Because practically all 75mm recoilless ammo was going to Korea, only part of the training given each replacement draft could be accomplished by firing the gun with regular service ammunition. The most beneficial training for the men was the time spent with the sub-caliber training aids.



When first assigned as a member of an antitank company with the 7th Marines in Korea, I was alarmed at the poor results obtained when firing missions with the 75mm recoilless gun at ranges over 2,100 yards. The men in my unit were average in training and skill when compared with antitank companies in the other regiments. They were especially good shots when firing with the direct sight at short and medium ranges, but lacked the skill and accuracy necessary in firing at ranges greater than 2,100 yards with the indirect sight.

Those familiar with the 75mm recoilless gun know that it has two sights: the M85C which is used for direct fire up to and including 2,100 yards, and the M34 which is used for all indirect fire and ranges greater

than 2,100 yards. The direct sight employs the ladder reticle used on many weapons today and enables gunners to fire the weapon effectively with very little practice. The indirect sight, however, has a more complicated mechanism requiring two different adjustments to align the sights properly on a point target at a given range and direction. Firing with this M34 sight requires much training and practice to master the various adjustments.

In Korea when our regiment was placed in the division reserve area, the special equipment section of the 1st Ordnance Battalion built three sub-caliber firing devices for our company. These were put into the training schedule immediately. As there were only 80 rounds of standard service ammunition allotted to train the six squads, the sub-caliber device was used extensively. In a one-month period over 2,500 rounds

of the inexpensive carbine ammo were expended. Later we used the small amount of ammunition that had been allotted for training purposes against the enemy. That the training was invaluable was proven when one of the crews placed five out of six rounds of 75mm into a house at 4,900 yards range—and this was done while the crew was under enemy mortar fire! The platoon leader, Lieutenant J. C. McCamic, summarized the importance of the aid as follows:

"This device eliminates wear on the weapon and reduces to a minimum the use of scarce service ammunition for training. At the same time the device greatly improves the value of gun drill, thus adding immeasurably to the efficiency and teamwork of the unit.

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\$40.3
recoi

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"The value of the device was proven in our last firing exercise when the gun crews repeatedly hit point targets at ranges far in excess of the maximum effective range of the weapon."

Because of the present-day interest in economy as well as improved training methods, the low-cost operation of the sub-caliber device as a training aid makes it very desirable. Over 430 rounds of carbine ammunition can be fired for the cost of one round of regular 75mm recoilless gun ammunition.* There is also a substantial difference in the cost, space and manpower involved in shipping, handling and storing the ammunition. Over 2,000 rounds of carbine ammunition can be fitted into the space required for just one round of 75mm ammo.

Upkeep and replacement of parts may also be minimized through use of the sub-caliber device. The cost

of the vent bushings and breech blocks alone would have amounted to \$350.

Another major consideration is the cost of constructing firing ranges and targets. The sub-caliber range need be only 200 to 300 yards in depth, as compared with 5,000 yards minimum for a standard firing range for the 75mm recoilless when using standard ammunition. Large, rigidly constructed targets are also required for the 75mm gun range, while a small, comparatively simple target can be utilized on a sub-caliber range.

Better control and more rapid training is also possible on the small range. The results of each round fired can be seen easily (especially when tracer ammo is used) and the instructors or squad leaders can quickly adjust their team's fire without going to the target or moving from the firing line. Moving targets



esting and allows the instructors to observe more closely just how well the gunners are doing, and whether or not they are applying the necessary corrections and adjustments.

I believe that training could be greatly improved, at reduced cost, on our heavy weapons by adopting a sub-caliber device similar to that used for the 75mm recoilless gun. If such devices were included in every heavy weapon's spare parts equipment, they would be available for training whenever the opportunity permitted.

This article should not be construed as encouraging the manufacture of sub-caliber devices or "jury rigs" locally, where neither the facilities for development nor testing are adequate. However, there are a number of sub-caliber devices that have been tried, tested and standardized. Whenever possible these aids should be used to improve training. In the case of our company, training with the sub-caliber device for the 75mm recoilless weapon resulted in better marksmanship, greater confidence and higher combat efficiency.

USMC



is substantial when it is realized that the replacement value of the 75mm gun is over \$3,000. The tube will stand the firing of 5,000 rounds of service ammunition before being replaced. However, the vent bushing and breech block are supposed to be replaced after 300 rounds. In one month's training in Korea, we fired 2,500 rounds of carbine ammunition through the sub-caliber device with no harmful effects. If the same number of 75mm recoilless shells had been fired it would have been necessary to replace five vent bushings and breech blocks, and the life of the tube would have been shortened by 50 percent. The replacement cost

also can be employed and controlled easily with considerable reduction in the time required for construction and maintenance. These considerations are especially important in combat conditions similar to the Korean action. As a result of casualties, transfers and the rotation of personnel back to the States, there was a never-ending job of training gunners. With the sub-caliber device the job of training was accomplished in less time with better results.


There are those who will say that gun drill will suffice in training troops. Although it is definitely a "must" in training, often so much time is allotted without the proper incentive that the troops neglect to put the required effort into the drill. The addition of the sub-caliber device makes the training more inter-

*Ed: One round of carbine ammunition costs about nine cents as compared with \$40.33 for one round of the regular 75mm recoilless ammunition.





Bettmann



Bettmann

"Conspicuous among all was the conduct of the Marines. . ."

AS FREQUENTLY AS THAT TRIBUTE might have—and has been—written about the combat behavior of the United States Marines, this phrase comes from a report on the activities of the Confederate States Marines. The occasion was an action on the Neuse River in North Carolina, when Confederate sailors and

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REBEL MARINES

By Maj Patrick Laughlin



National Archives

Marines, attacking from small boats, successfully boarded the United States Ship *Underwriter* in the face of the ship's fire and that of Yankee-operated shore batteries. The report continues: "... a company of them under Captain Thomas S. Wilson being distributed through the boats. As the Confederates came up to the ship the Marines rose and delivered their fire, taking accurate aim, reloading still under the heavy fire from the enemy. When on board they obeyed their orders promptly, and, forming on the hurricane deck, not even the explosion of the monster shell fired by the enemy from one of the shore batteries among them could break the ranks or turn a man from his post."

The engagement took place on 31 January 1864. At the end of the action the Confederates owned the ship, the Yankee skipper was dead and the surviving crew members were prisoners.

The high standard of training and discipline demonstrated by Confederate Marines in this action was true throughout the short and generally unsung history of that Corps. Allowing for the repeatedly demonstrated high quality of the individual Southern fighting man—and with due regard for Southern sympathies—this excellent record probably de-

rives from the fact that the Confederate Marine Corps was 50 percent of the curious and reasonably unique spectacle of a military organization, i.e., The United States Marine Corps, literally deployed against itself.

Neither training, discipline nor a reputation for excellence are recently acquired characteristics of the United States Marine Corps. It was known for outstanding performance when the guns at Sumter heralded the outbreak of armed sectional conflict. Along with Robert E. Lee and hundreds of others, each officer of the United States Navy and Marine Corps then had to make his own personal decision. The old flag or the new? By June of 1861 one-fifth of the officers of the regular Naval establishment had answered the question by resigning their commissions in the United States Navy. Officers of Southern sympathies in the United States Marine Corps followed suit. Two majors, four captains, seven first lieutenants and four second lieutenants elected to go with the South. These officers all subsequently entered the Confederate States Marine Corps.

The resignations occurred during the spring and early summer of 1861. Without—so far as is known—any preconceived plan of action,

the Southern ex-Marines drifted to Richmond. For men looking for a fight it was, of course, an obvious thing to do. The capital of the Confederacy had been transferred from Montgomery, Alabama, to the Virginia city and the organization of the Confederate armed forces was proceeding there. In any event, planned or otherwise, the former officers and about 100 ex-enlisted U.S. Marines were brought together in Richmond in May of 1861 to form the nucleus of the Confederate States Marine Corps.

The Corps had been provided for in an act of the Confederate Congress of 21 February 1861, which authorized a Confederate States Navy and a Marine Corps. Under the provisions of the legislation, the new Corps was to consist of one major, one quartermaster, one paymaster, one adjutant, one sergeant major, one quartermaster sergeant and six companies of Marines. Each company was allowed one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, four sergeants, four corporals, 100 other enlisted and 10 musicians. Later legislation increased the authorized size of the Corps and allowed for a colonel-commandant and one lieutenant colonel.

Enlistments in the Corps were set

at three years or duration of the war. The pay of enlisted men was to be that authorized for infantrymen of equivalent rank. Seamen's rations were allowed for enlisted personnel. First enlistments carried with them a bounty of \$50. Re-enlistments were worth \$40. To provide for these and other payments, the Confederate Congress in March 1861 appropriated \$175,512 for the pay of the Marine Corps.

Officers who entered the Confederate service after resigning their Federal appointments were commissioned in the rank formerly held. The concept of a military organization deployed against itself is borne out by the fact that with the exception of the Commandant, one or two former Naval officers and two appointed from civilian life, all officers of the Confederate Marine Corps were ex-USMC.

The Commandant named by President Jefferson Davis was Colonel Lloyd J. Beall, who prior to the secession was an officer in the United States Army. He remained as Commandant of the Corps throughout the war. Of its origin and personnel he wrote in later years: "The Corps was composed of enlisted men, many of whom were old soldiers, and commissioned officers, a number of whom had seen service before in the U. S. Marine Corps and elsewhere."

Apparently the Confederate Marine Corps followed the same system of recruit training before assignment to an organization that is in use in the U. S. Marine Corps today. In several of the remaining records there is mention of a "training camp" to which recruits were sent. Its location is not definitely established, though it may have been the Confederate Naval Station at Charleston, South Carolina. The mere fact of its existence, however, indicates a characteristic, systematic Marine approach to the business of fighting a war, even in those relatively disorganized days. It was also in distinct contrast to procedures in other elements of the fighting forces, Northern and Southern, where men ordinarily received what training they got after joining their units.

Following the initial organization, the exigencies of the service and the requirements of war made for changes in the Confederate Ma-

rine Corps. Like its parent, the U. S. Marine Corps, the Confederate establishment was designed to provide ships' detachments, and guards for naval shore stations. This required that numerous small units be sent off to semi-independent duty, isolated from the centralized control of the Corps. Accordingly, the Confederate Congress at various times provided for increased numbers of junior officers, non-commissioned officers and musicians to give detachments the organic ability to operate independently. Later, when recruiting slowed and conscription became a part of the Southern war effort, men enrolled under the draft act were permitted to choose service in the Marine Corps.

Surviving rosters of ships' Marine detachments of the Confederate Navy indicate that for some reason or reasons unknown St. Patrick's day must have been a matter for almost continuous celebration in the Confederate Corps. On the CSS *Baltic*, for example, the Marine guard totaled 31 men. In that comparatively small group the Emerald Isle was represented by Mullins, McLaughlin, Kennedy, O'Keefe, Dorgan, Kinney, Casey, Connell, Dwyer, Humphrey, Murphy, Riley, Conway, Moran, Naughton, Mulvey and McCormick. The 12-man detachment on the CSS *North Carolina* mustered Haggerty, Joyce, Mulcahy, Quigley, McDade, Hickey, Murphy, McGeehan and Sullivan. The remaining names were Welsh in origin. On the CSS *Raleigh* the Marine detachment boasted five Patricks, which must have pleased the good Saint, small matter what the Yankees thought.

A complete, sequential history of the combat operations of the Confederate Marines is a literal impossibility. The small units noted above participated in numerous local actions, records of which were never kept, or which have since been lost. Toward the end of the war, Colonel Beall's home, in which many of the records of the Corps were kept, burned to the ground. Very few of the colonel's personal or official papers were saved. Later, in the lowering days when Richmond was being evacuated under Federal pressure, records of the Confederate Marine Corps were sent from the capital to Danville, Virginia, where they were

ultimately destroyed. As a result, occasional official reports, cross-references and incidental notes in personal memoirs are all that remain of the history of the Confederate States Marine Corps.

What is left, however, indicates consistent efficiency and uniform gallantry. During most of 1862, the bulk of the Corps remained in the vicinity of Richmond, guarding the Naval stations in and about the city. On 9 March of that year, however, Confederate Marines participated in the historic fight between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac*—the latter ship being known to the Confederates as the *Virginia*. A squad of Marines worked guns on the *Merrimac* during the engagement that was to end the era of wooden ships in the American Navy. They were under the command of Captain Reuben Thom, of whom Captain Buchanan, CSN, commanding the *Merrimac*, wrote: "... his tranquil mien gave evidence that the hottest fire was no novelty to him."

A month later, on 15 May 1862, another break in the routine occurred. On that date a battalion of Marines, commanded by Captain John D. Simms, helped turn back Federal ships trying to pass Drewry's Bluff on the James River below Richmond. The captain's official report tells the story: "On the 15th Inst., the enemy's gunboats having made their appearance near the battery at Drewry's Bluff, I stationed my command on the bluffs some 200 yards from them, to act as sharpshooters. . . . The fire of the enemy was materially silenced at intervals by the fire of our troops. It gives me much pleasure to call your attention to the coolness of the officers and men under the severe fire of the enemy. The companies composing my battalion were commanded by Captains A. C. Benthuyzen and J. E. Meiere."

It was after the action at Drewry's Bluff that detachments of the Confederate Marine Corps were sent out to various naval stations, to vessels of the Confederate Navy preparing for sea, and to coast-defense installations.

Colonel Beall's report of 30 October 1864, to the Honorable Stephen Russell Mallory, Secretary of the Confederate Navy, shows a total CSMC strength of 539 officers and

men. In addition, at that time two captains, three lieutenants and 62 privates were prisoners of the Federals. Confederate Marines were stationed at the naval facilities at Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, Wilmington and Drewry's Bluff. Besides these, there were Marine detachments on three iron-clad steamers on the James River and at the Richmond navy yards. Marine guards were also assigned to the armed steamers *Tallahassee* and *Chickamauga*, both of them designed as commerce raiders.


In the same report, Colonel Beall noted: "Since my last report the

Marines have been called upon for active service, they have displayed the promptness and efficiency of well-disciplined soldiers."

The action on the Neuse River, near the site of Camp Lejeune, has already been mentioned. Toward the end of 1864, Marines actually fought Marines during the Federal assault on and capture of Fort Fisher, at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. The attack took place on 24 and 25 December and was preceded by a considerable bombardment against the seaward side of the fort. Following the bombardment, sailors and U. S. Marines

night with the rest of the little garrison, falling back from gun chamber to gun chamber. . . . They were all killed or captured."

And, of course, Fort Fisher fell. Later, when the end was very near, in February and March of 1865, companies and detachments of the Corps not isolated in besieged Mobile, or at sea, gathered for a last-ditch defense of Richmond. They made up part of a naval brigade organized and directed by Commander John R. Tucker, CSN, and were assigned the old Marine positions at Drewry's Bluff. There they held out until someone else



The Battle for Fort Fisher—Marines fought Marines

Marines have been under the enemy's fire at Drewry's Bluff and on the James River; also in the land and naval engagement near Mobile on the 5th and 6th of August last. A Marine guard under the command of Lieutenant Crenshaw was attached to the Confederate steamship *Tallahassee* during the late cruise, when much damage was inflicted upon the enemy's shipping at sea."

The conclusion of his report reflects a pattern of performance already thoroughly established:

"Upon all occasions when the

landed to take possession. They were stoutly resisted by the surviving Confederates, among whom were 50 Marines in a fortification known as the Battery Buchanan. With the Marines were their officers, Captain Van Benthuyzen and Lieutenants Henry N. Doak and J. Campbell Murdoch. According to a surviving Confederate naval officer: "Among those of the garrison of Battery Buchanan who were actively engaged in repelling the combined attack of the Federal Army and Navy, were the Confederate Marines. . . . How they worked that

stopped the fighting. And that was the end of the Confederate States Marine Corps. But perhaps not quite. There is a curious immortality in Marines.

Long after the war Colonel Beall wrote simple words that stand as a stirring epitaph to the proud men he commanded:

"The Corps was thoroughly trained and disciplined, and in all encounters with the enemy the officers and men were conspicuous for their courage and good conduct."


Or, put in an older language, *Sic Semper Marines!*

US MC

SKY HOOK

A salvage job on two downed helicopters in Korea proved that the 'Flying Pod' is no artist's dream, but a workable reality

By Capt Joseph H. Strain



Above 40 knots, a "tucking" sensation

THE PURPOSE OF OPERATION Bushbeater was neither to chop wood nor to scare the infantry, but it succeeded in doing both.

Ten helicopters from Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 had been ordered to shuttle 270 troops to mountain-top positions along both flanks of the 1st Marine Division. Since there were no suitable landing sites along the razorback North Korean ridges, the 'copters hovered above the dead trees and rocky pinnacles while Marine infantrymen landed by climbing down 40-foot knotted ropes. As soon as the troops had landed they formed patrols and converged toward the division main supply route, beating the bushes for infiltrators.

Before the operation was over, two of the helicopters had crashed. HR-9 was balanced precariously on top of a ridge, its main rotor blades and tail cone wrecked; HR-6 lay where it had wound up after sliding tail-first down a 60-degree slope and chewing into a grove of scrub trees. Despite the seriousness of the inci-

dent, only one man was injured and his sole comment was, "I'm okay, but look what I did to that helicopter!"

From an aviation point of view, the main problem of the operation was to determine whether the HRS-1 could hover out of ground effect and at altitude with a load of two pilots and six combat-equipped troops. In spite of the assertion of the *Pilot's Handbook* that the HRS-1 was designed "to seat ten passengers," it was found that its capabilities were considerably more modest, at least under combat conditions in Korea. However, in justice to the HRS-1, it should be made clear that it out-performed all other helicopters tested in Korea and has, on several occasions, moved an entire battalion of troops into battle position without loss of a single man or aircraft.

That Operation Bushbeater was expensive is understandable; most combat evaluations are. The important point is that valuable lessons were learned about the limitations and capabilities of the HRS-1 and its tactical employment. In the fu-

ture, these lessons should save both lives and money. Equally important are the lessons learned from the ensuing salvage operations, and it is with these that this article is chiefly concerned.

Owing to the inaccessible locations of HR-6 and HR-9, both aircraft were written off the books as strikes. Actually, the main and tail rotors and one tail cone had been damaged beyond repair, but the engines, transmissions, rotorheads, radios, instruments and even fuselages were relatively undamaged. Since there was no immediate possibility of replacing the downed aircraft, it was decided to attempt to salvage them.

Major Edwin Shifflett, HMR-161 engineering officer, assigned the salvage job to his two assistants, Captain James Cotton and CWO Pat Sumners. After making a preliminary aerial photo reconnaissance to determine the extent of damage, they abandoned their initial idea of repairing the aircraft on the spot and flying them out, in favor of disman-

ting them and moving the parts out by air. Accordingly, they established liaison with the Shore Party Bn and Engineer Bn, both of the 1st Marine Division. As a result of this meeting it was decided that shore party men would be debarked via knotted ropes and clear landing sites for additional salvage helicopters.

Under the direction of 1stLt John J. Fernane, the shore party landed and, by means of shovels, axes and demolitions, cleared two landing sites. Upon their completion, two four-man working parties from the HMR-161 engineering department were flown in to dismantle the two helicopters.

HR-6 had lodged in the bottom of a ravine located on the opposite side of the ridge from the landing site. The parts would have to be hauled up the east slope and eased down the west slope. After removing the radio gear and instruments, TSgt McAuliffe and his crew quickly dismantled the 'copter into transportable units: engine, transmission, rotorhead, landing gear and tail cone. The "component package" construction of the HRS-1 greatly facilitated dismantling, transporting and re-assembling the 'copters.

Next, a working party from the Engineer Bn, headed by 1stLt Thomas P. Payton III, was given the job of moving the salvaged parts over the ridge to the landing site. Working with characteristic vigor and ingenuity, they rigged a block and tackle, loaded the parts on a makeshift sled and hauled them to the landing site. The heaviest load was the engine, which weighed approximately 1,000 pounds. Like the other parts, it was hauled a distance of 250 feet up a 50 to 60-degree slope, then lowered down a 30-degree incline for a distance of 400 feet.

Once the parts were at the landing site, the smaller sections were loaded internally in the salvage helicopter and flown to the base, a distance of about four miles. The larger parts, such as the engine, were loaded in cargo nets and picked up by hovering helicopters. A hole had been dug in the ground at the helicopter base and served as an emergency engine stand. The salvage helicopter hovered over the hole while ground personnel maneuvered the engine so that it was supported by the cylinders rather than by its



Block and tackle, sleds, muscles

delicate nose section.

For the time being, the fuselage of HR-6 was left where it had crashed. It was salvaged later.

Meanwhile, work on HR-9, under the direction of MSgt Wesley Fussell, progressed in much the same manner as on HR-6. The landing site was located in a saddle lower down the ridgeline, and parts were moved down a 15-degree slope for a distance of several hundred yards. The sled was restrained by guide lines and by a safety line snubbed around a tree. By this time only the shell of the fuselage remained, and the question naturally arose, "Why not attach it to the salvage helicopter and fly it out?" In that way, one helicopter could be rebuilt from the parts of the two damaged ones. Only new rotor blades and a few minor parts would have to be supplied.

Major William P. Mitchell, HMR-161 executive officer, bought the idea and decided to try it. Ropes were attached to the four corners of the fuselage and looped so that they could be attached to the cargo hook beneath the salvage helicopter. The fuselage had been stripped until it weighed about 1,000 pounds. The chief problem lay in its unwieldy size. Even if the salvage helicopter could pick up the fuselage, there was a strong possibility that the fuselage would revolve in the rotor blast and snap its ropes.

However, the salvage helicopter, piloted by Major Mitchell, picked up the fuselage without difficulty

and headed for the base. The suspended fuselage swung back and forth and revolved slightly. At speeds above 40 knots, it produced a "tucking" sensation, but at 40 knots or less the flight characteristics of the parent aircraft were normal. After a 15-minute flight, the fuselage was safely deposited at the helicopter base and from there was transported by truck to HMR-161 rear-echelon repair facilities. Here, under the direction of CWO Sumners and MSgt McAuliffe, it was combined with parts from HR-6 and rebuilt. Then "HR-69" was put into service airlifting troops, ammunition, food and wounded in support of the 1st Marine Division.

Later, steps were taken to salvage the fuselage of HR-6, which had been left in the ravine where it had crashed. In a two-day project the fuselage was hauled up the steep slope to a saddle in the ridgeline, where it was picked up by a hovering helicopter.

Conditions differed from the previous "flying pod" lift in that a strong wind was blowing, and the air in the mountains was turbulent. The suspended fuselage swung and twisted quite violently, and though Major Mitchell was tempted to deposit his load on the MSR, he was able to fly it all the way back to base where it could be refitted.

Thus, through Marine ingenuity, thousands of dollars were saved and valuable equipment was salvaged to fight again.

USMC

passing in review

BOOKS OF
INTEREST TO
OUR READERS

Hard-Charger . . .

SHERIDAN THE INEVITABLE—Richard O'Connor. 357 pages, illustrated. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. \$3.50

In the early morning of 1 July 1862, Confederate General James R. Chalmers and 6,000 troopers advanced on Booneville, Miss., to wipe out a Federal outpost of 827 men.

Three and a half miles from Booneville, the Confederate advance guard made contact with the Federal pickets. At this point, most Federal cavalrymen of the day would have used their horses—either to mount a mad, useless charge into the Confederate lines, or to ride rapidly away from the engagement. Instead, fighting dismounted, these Federal cavalrymen fell back slowly, delaying the enemy to the fullest extent before reaching the thin main defense line.

Though considerably outmatched in manpower, the colonel commanding the Federal brigade had the advantage of superior firepower, as his troopers were armed with Colt revolving rifles and pistols, capable of firing six shots without reloading. Further, by a close study of the terrain, he had emplaced his troops where they could observe the advance of the enemy and take him under a devastating fire as he approached their positions. By three o'clock the combination of superior firepower and a surprise cavalry attack in the enemy's rear had sent the Confederate division reeling back along the road in such complete confusion and panic that the dead and wounded were left behind. The man whose clear thinking and coolness under fire made such a feat possible was Colonel Philip Henry Sheridan.

Sheridan the Inevitable is the complete story of the poor son of an Irish immigrant who rose to be the youngest, the most aggressive, the most versatile and the most uniformly successful of the four great Union commanders in the Civil War. His

belief that the offensive, invested with all the power and determination possible, is more economical of lives and more effective strategically than more cautious tactics, is the animating factor in modern American military thinking. Sheridan's use of cavalry as a striking arm provided the model for the free-wheeling armored thrusts of World War II. His simple formula for success in battle,



"Trust your reputation to the private and he will never let your military fame suffer," is one that has never failed commanders who have employed it.

Richard O'Connor has set forth in particularly readable language Sheridan's early life and his duty in the West prior to the Civil War. His later campaigns, including Perryville, Stone's River, Missionary Ridge, Yellow Tavern and his famous ride to turn the surprise Confederate attack at Cedar Creek into a decisive Union victory, are written in a fashion that will lift the reader out of the present day and into the saddle with Sheridan as he spurs forward shouting to the faltering Union line, "You will sleep in your tents tonight, or you will sleep in hell!" For the tactical lessons it teaches and for the pure pleasure of reading, *Sheridan the Inevitable* should find a place in the bookcase of every military reader.

Reviewed by Maj G. P. Averill

Fifty Years of Flight . . .

CEILING UNLIMITED—Lloyd Morris and Kendall Smith, 417 pages, illustrated. New York: Macmillan. \$6.50

This is the story of American powered flight from Kitty Hawk to supersonics. *Ceiling Unlimited* is not only a detailed study of America's quest for aviation knowledge and achievement, but above all is a story of human beings, their efforts, dreams and singularity of purpose. It was published this year to coincide with the celebration of the 50th anniversary of American aviation.

It was a cold and windy morning December 17th in 1903 when the Wrights launched their "flying machine" from the sand dunes of Kitty Hawk, N. C. That epochal flight measured 120 feet from take-off to landing point. With characteristic precision, Orville described their achievement:

"This flight lasted only 12 seconds, but it was nevertheless the first in the history of the world in which a machine carrying a man . . . raised itself by its own power into the air in full flight, and sailed forward without reduction of speed, and . . . finally landed at a point as high as that from which it started."

A modest beginning to be sure, but it was the start of an endless number of individual and group accomplishments which have brought us to the threshold of "spaceships" capable of reaching interplanetary zones at a speed of 24,000 miles per hour. That first successful flight was one which saw the Wrights' dream come true only after months and years of heartbreak over earlier failures.

Samuel Langley along with Charles Manley, the engineering genius, had experimented with their "aerodrome" and were ready to steal the show nine days before the Wrights' debut, but as fate would have it, Langley's craft was doomed to failure. Manley, the pilot, was lucky to

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escape with his life, and Langley, disconsolate and heartbroken, was on his deathbed in less than two years, never to taste the fruits of victory.

The shrinking of the world began in 1909 with Louis Bleriot's flight across the channel from Calais to the cliffs of Dover. It continued with Glenn Curtiss' flight from Albany to New York in 1910, Calbraith Rodgers' bridging of the continent when he flew from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast in 1911, and it has maintained its unrelenting pace of trans-continental and trans-oceanic spannings to the present day.

With the advent of aerial refueling even the most remote places became as next door neighbors. A dramatic demonstration of the flexibility of range due to aerial refueling was given in March 1949, when the "Lucky Lady II," an Air Force bomber, covered 23,000 miles in the first non-stop, around-the-world flight.

For the reader who is looking for cold figures and comparative graphs, *Ceiling Unlimited* will be a disappointment. Lloyd Morris and Kendall Smith have compiled the records of aviation's past 50 years in a manner which will interest the biographical reader as well as the aviation enthusiast. The private lives of such scientists as the Wrights, Curtiss, the Lindberghs, Hughes, Doolittle and Arnold, their ambitions, dreams, and the driving force behind those ambitions are woven with their accomplishments as threads in a web. Although this book cannot be classed as great because of its limited appeal, it is nevertheless worthy of note as an excellent history of America's second largest industry.

Reviewed by Captain B. C. Marks

Fighting with the Atom . . .

ATOMIC WEAPONS IN LAND COMBAT—Col G. C. Reinhardt and Lt-Col W. R. Kintner, 182 pages, illustrated. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co. \$3.95

Now that our growing stockpile permits tactical use of atomic weapons, these two forward looking officers have firmly planted their feet at ground zero and answered a service-wide need by giving us *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*. They offer it as a handbook of atomic defense and offense for the combat division—from its commander and his

staff to the rifleman—and it can well be accepted as such.

The keynote of the book is contained in the passage, "War without men, pushbutton war—all false shibboleths purporting to wage war without manpower—receive no support from atomic tactics. Yet . . . atomic weapons do offer a devastating rebuttal to human-sea tactics resorted to by aggressors utterly indifferent to human casualties."

With atomic weapons the enemy



may now be hit with safety and profit where he is strongest instead of where he is weakest. However, this blow must be immediately exploited before the physical and psychological shock wears off. As the authors paraphrase Napoleon, "Exploitation is to destruction as three to one." In defense, atomic weapons can compensate for our numerical inferiority. The most profitable way is seen as an atomic preparation for the counter-attack of an enemy breakthrough. And the authors properly insist that, "No stockpile can stand the drain of attempting to destroy a major foe with unexploited explosions."

Training is the "indispensable ingredient" to the effective use of and defense against atomic weapons by ground combat forces. Indoctrination to lessen the psychological shock of atomic devastation, and strict discipline in matters of individual protection are necessary if troops are to quickly and fearlessly follow up our atomic attacks as well as recover rapidly from the enemy's. Commanders and staffs need to be trained in atomic target selection and how to judge our vulnerability and the enemy's capabilities.

A renaissance in generalship is foreseen. The weighing of calculated risks and the making of command decisions, with atomic destruction the payoff for a wrong move, puts a premium on outstanding leadership. In this, "an ounce of genius is worth a pound of competency." Leadership

must instill resoluteness in rear units so that they may survive and continue to support the front. It must also insure that all protective measures are being taken in all units. Command action must promote supply austerity to reduce the need for large, vulnerable logistic installations.

This otherwise timely and excellent book suffers somewhat from several deficiencies which probably will be noted by most Marines. Although mentioning airborne operations as an effective means of deep exploitation of an atomic attack, the authors ignore the Marine Corps' maneuver-tested technique of landing helicopter-borne troops at ground zero in close co-ordination with the surface attack. They devote much discussion to problems of requesting and controlling atomic weapons delivery by tactical air support. All the problems posed are inherent in the Army-Air Force system of air support, but are non-existent under the Navy-Marine Corps system of close air support. Likewise they avoid recognition of armor as the answer to battlefield defense and rapid exploitation of atomic attack. Admittedly, for reasons of economy and logistics, armies cannot consist entirely of armor. Still, armor is believed by many to be the answer to protection and mobility requirements where dispersion is impossible or undesirable. The authors are at least on speaking terms with amphibious operations and have identified but not offered solutions to many of the problems posed by atomic weapons.

In spite of the above deficiencies this book is recommended for all Marines in the atomic age. It should focus thinking on the problems of atomic warfare and will provide a ready reference on its tactical, training, and elementary technical aspects.

Colonel Reinhardt, an engineer, and Lieutenant Colonel Kintner, an infantryman, conceived this project while atomic weapons instructors at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Their previous broad experience and education further prepared them for this undertaking. Both are well known for their frequent contributions to this and other professional journals.

Reviewed by LtCol Brooke Nihart

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Gripping Heroism . . .

THE SURVIVORS—Ronald McKie, 246 pages. Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. \$3.00

This is the story of the sinking of the HMAS *Perth* and the week of horror that followed.

As a background, the author tells of the battle of the Java Sea, and in the process does quite a bit of Monday morning quarterbacking. There is also a lengthy character portrayal of Captain H. M. L. Waller, who was skipper of the *Perth*.

The story moves on then and unfolds through the eyes of 10 men. These men are strategically placed throughout the ship and the actual battle is preceded by a thumbnail sketch of each person. Therein lies one of the faults of the book—it is extremely hard to connect the characters and their experiences with these sketches.

The narrative unfolds roughly in chronological order. This technique provides a second drawback for the reader since the style is reminiscent of a cowboy movie serial. One of the characters is left thwartships of a flooding passageway, another is left fainting at the high-water mark on an island and a third is pictured standing on the red-hot steel deck of a Japanese destroyer with the ends of the broken bones of his leg protruding—he's naked and can't sit or lie down.

The nightmare of leaving the ship and the hours spent in the oil-covered water emphasize the small decisions which make the difference between death or survival. The grim abortive attempts to escape capture and continue fighting will leave the reader frustrated. All of the survivors were captured within a week and it will sicken the reader to know that there were Dutch and Javanese Quislings in Java.

Readers will be appalled at the brutality of some of the Japanese captors but they'll thrill at the gentleness, humanity and understanding of Eliza, a Filipino woman, who says she is the widow of a Roman Catholic missionary. Then they'll meet a Japanese colonel whose transport was sunk by either the *Perth* or the *Hudson*, an enemy who is a gentleman in every sense of the word. Finally, the readers will wonder at the Australians beating

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
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Japanese soldiers (whose transports have been sunk) off their life rafts.

The Survivors is an extremely gripping book. Once started, I didn't want to put it down. It has authenticity and simplicity of heroic deeds told without embellishment.

Reviewed by Colonel W. F. Prickett

Behind the Bamboo Curtain . . .

REPORT ON MAO'S CHINA—Frank Moraes, 212 pages. New York: The MacMillen Company. \$4.00

With a keen analytical mind, Frank Moraes, one of the members

of a group of Indians invited by Mao Tse-tung to visit China on a "cultural" mission to study the progress of the Red Government, sets down an unbiased, impartial and factual report on what is taking place behind the "Bamboo Curtain."

The author clearly describes what is actually going on in the heart and mind of Mao's China, touching every phase of Chinese life. His candid and frank explanation of the subtle and sinister methods used by the ruthless leaders of Red China to thoroughly indoctrinate the masses

to Communism are plainly presented.

With uncanny ability the author gets to the score of how and why Communism was able to step into a void left by the impact of the West, and fill it with the insidious hate doctrine of Marxism and Stalinism.

He tells how these teachings were used to emancipate the Chinese women and instill fiery emotion and force into the farmers, peasants, students and children by arousing new hopes and ideas, with a view in mind of creating a new and militant China.

His account of the relationship between Russia and China gives the reader a clear insight into how Peking has been drawn deeper into the Soviet orbit. He discusses the West's blockade and Korea, Japan, Formosa and India's position in the complex struggle for Asia.

Mr. Moraes describes how Mao was able to mold Communism into the ideological framework of Confucianism, though its basic principles are poles apart from Marxism. He tells how Communism responds to the practical, utilitarian urge in the Chinese national character.

The author "peeped" into factories, coal mines, textile mills and government projects, and by adroit questioning penetrated the Red camouflage subtly used to give the outsider the impression of increased industrial progress.

The effectiveness of the hate campaign against Americans, spawned by Mao and transplanted into the minds of the masses, is used by the Red dictator to inflame and exploit his subjects.

Report on Mao's China should be read by every American. It is the clearest account ever written on how Communism actually operates in every phase of national life in the new, militant Red China.

Reviewed by CWO William B. Kohl

Books on Parade

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The Rommel Papers *H. Liddel Hart*. Erwin Rommel had recorded the story of his dramatic career and the exact details of his masterly campaigns. From this first-hand material, Mr. Hart has drawn a complete, authoritative account. Rommel's own sketch-plans for the battles of Tobruk and Gazala are included. **\$6.00**

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COMMANDANT'S BIRTHDAY MESSAGE - 10 NOVEMBER 1953

The Marine Corps Birthday of 1953 is the first anniversary in four years which does not find men of the Corps in action. It marks the end of a long and arduous period of combat by our air and ground forces in Korea — combat which has added further to the host of battle honors won by the Corps.

Now, with the halt in active combat, we find our Corps once again in its traditional posture of striving to improve itself in peace so that it may be fully ready for war. We know that the weapons, the tactics, and the techniques of the last battle are never adequate for the next. For that reason, we must never falter in our efforts to be stronger through day to day increases in our skill, our efficiency, and our overall readiness to meet any challenge that the future may hold.



"... deep satisfaction with the past"



"... full confidence for

It is in the memory of those brave men that we find the confidence and courage to meet the responsibilities which confront the Corps today. While those responsibilities have never been heavier, I believe that the superb accomplishments of every man and woman in the Corps during the past year are a clear measure of our ability to meet them. It is therefore with a sense of deep satisfaction with the past, and of full confidence for the future, that I extend to Marines everywhere — regular and reserve, active and inactive — my personal best wishes and sincere thanks on this, the happy occasion of the 178th anniversary of our beloved Corps.

Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.

LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.
General, U. S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps



the future"